Conscious experience and thought content are customarily treated as distinct problems. This book argues that they are not. Part One develops a chastened empiricist theory of content, which cedes to experience a crucial role in rooting the contents of thoughts, but deploys an expanded conception of experience and of the ways in which contents may be rooted in experience. Part Two shows how, were the world as we experience it to be, our neurophysiology would be sufficient to constitute capacities for the range of intuitive thoughts recognized by Part One. Part Three argues that physics has...
Conscious experience and thought content are customarily treated as distinct problems. This book argues that they are not. Part One develops a chasten...
It is a truism that turbulence is an unsolved problem, whether in scientific, engin eering or geophysical terms. It is strange that this remains largely the case even though we now know how to solve directly, with the help of sufficiently large and powerful computers, accurate approximations to the equations that govern tur bulent flows. The problem lies not with our numerical approximations but with the size of the computational task and the complexity of the solutions we gen erate, which match the complexity of real turbulence precisely in so far as the computations mimic the real flows....
It is a truism that turbulence is an unsolved problem, whether in scientific, engin eering or geophysical terms. It is strange that this remains large...
(YET ANOTHER INTRODUCTION IN PHENOMENOLOGY) In both his published and unpublished works, Edmund Husserl, the "father of phenomenology," struggles repeatedly with the relation of the individual subject and intersubjectivity. Since his phenomenology is based upon the temporalizing foundations of the subject, though, he is often accused of solipsism, and his efforts at integrating the subject with an intersubjective existence are registered as falling short of their goal. Important philosophers who use phenomenology as their basis, such as Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, furthermore,...
(YET ANOTHER INTRODUCTION IN PHENOMENOLOGY) In both his published and unpublished works, Edmund Husserl, the "father of phenomenology," struggles repe...
The work aims at presenting new in-depth research on core topics of Husserl s thinking related to language (e.g., meaning, sign, ideality) supplemented with a variety of original phenomenological reflections on pre-linguistic experience, concept-formation and the limitations of (verbal) expression. In doing so, it supplies us the first anthology that focuses on Husserl s thinking in relation to language.
Most of the contributions to this volume are based on research originally presented at the Husserl Arbeitstage, which took place at the Husserl-Archives Leuven in November 2006. In...
The work aims at presenting new in-depth research on core topics of Husserl s thinking related to language (e.g., meaning, sign, ideality) suppleme...
This book is an effort to bring genetic-phenomenological analyses in contact with empirical psychology, neurology, cognitive science and research in primate cognition. The conclusion reached is that most higher-order achievements of our mind might in fact be accomplished without language in the low-level system of phantasmatic imagination. This leads to an "inclusive theory of the subject" which allows us to understand how higher-organized animals like primates can think.
This book is an effort to bring genetic-phenomenological analyses in contact with empirical psychology, neurology, cognitive science and research i...
. XIII VORWORT. I. KAPITEL. ZUR CHARAKTERISTIK DER "VERSETZTSEINSER LEBNISSE." 1. Wahrnehmung und Vorstellung . 2. Das Wesen der Vorstellung . II 3. Die "Versetztseinserlebnisse" . 18 4. Zur Charakteristik des Nacherlebens und Nachlebens . 24 5. Erinnerungsvorstellung und Erinnerung . 27 6. Der eigentliche Gegenstand der Erinnerung 32 7. "Sacherinnerung" in einem neuen Sinn 37 8. Erinnerung und Kenntnis 39 KAPITEL. DAS VOR-ERLEBEN II. 42 KAPITEL. DER TRAUM. III. 57 I. Traumerei und Traum 59 2. Der Traum . 62 3. Ruckblick 71 IV. KAPITEL. INNERES SPRECHEN UND INNERES HOREN 73 1. Das innere...
. XIII VORWORT. I. KAPITEL. ZUR CHARAKTERISTIK DER "VERSETZTSEINSER LEBNISSE." 1. Wahrnehmung und Vorstellung . 2. Das Wesen der Vorstellung . II 3. D...
Beyond their remarkable technical accomplishments, the new directions taken by the sciences in recent decades call for renewal of their epistemological basis. The purpose of this book is to show that Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, if properly re-examined, provides the required framework for such an epistemology. This re-examination is both critical and constructive. (i) The absolute subjectivization or the full naturalization of consciousness must be rejected. (ii) The necessarily transcendental character of phenomenology is put to work in the search for a systematic connection...
Beyond their remarkable technical accomplishments, the new directions taken by the sciences in recent decades call for renewal of their epistemologica...
English Version Anspruch und Rechtfertigung (Appeal and Justification) develops a phenomenological theory of judgments on legitimacy. It undertakes a first systematic investigation of the structures in consciousness which enable the process of justification to unfold.
The overall question is how the claim for legitimacy, inherent in both epistemological and ethical judgments, can be understood as a fundamental character of experience. The thesis that this book offers follows along the lines of a genetic answer to this question. It traces the...
English Version Anspruch und Rechtfertigung (Appeal and Justification) develops a phenomenological theory of...
Both volumes of this work have as their central concern to sort out who one is from what one is. In this Book 1, the focus is on transcendental-phenomenological ontology. When we refer to ourselves we refer both non-ascriptively in regard to non-propertied as well as ascriptively in regard to propertied aspects of ourselves. The latter is the richness of our personal being; the former is the essentially elusive central concern of this Book 1: I can be aware of myself and refer to myself without it being necessary to think of any third-personal characteristic; indeed one...
Both volumes of this work have as their central concern to sort out who one is from what one is. In this Book 1, the focus is on ...
