CJTF-HOA developed a course of action to win the War on Terror in the Horn of Africa. Because of the mission, resources available to the task force, and the nature of the conflict, the command chose a course of action that used Information Operations as the decisive operation. Specifically they focused on the Information Operation task of Information Engagement to accomplish the mission. Joint Military doctrine states that a valid COA is one that is adequate, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and complete. Since CJTF-HOA already implemented the course of action, the analysis was limited...

The Army in the early 1980's experienced a flourish of intellectual growth actuated by the negative experiences of many of its young officers during the Vietnam War and their dissatisfaction with the standards in professional military education. The focus of the Army at the time was planning and training the force to counter the Cold War military threat of the Warsaw Pact. An environment of increasing complexity was evolving as concurrent efforts to improve recruiting, reform training and doctrine, and field a new generation of major weapon systems forced Army leaders to seek better ways to...

Within the literature on Systemic Operational Design, discourse is generally treated as a mechanical communicative process. The monograph presents alternative ways to consider discourse, the implications of this for theory of Systemic Operational Design; and how these alternatives can lead to a richer understanding of discourse's role in design. To answer this question, it conducts a structured inquiry into the nature of discourse from the perspectives of agency, narrative and artifact structure, and socio-cultural relationships. Agency in design is viewed from a linguistic anthropological...

A confluence of factors led to American engagement in one of Central America's most violent uprisings: the Salvadoran civil war. By the time of President Ronald Reagan's first term as president, the civil war had created social, political and economic fissures within the Salvadoran state; these fissures presented the United States the opportunity to promote its policy agenda with the Central American country. Reagan's administration, however, got off to a slow start; his first-term approaches to Salvadoran engagement yielded very little and may have actually exacerbated the negative...

This monograph examines how the U.S. Army compares to other complex systems in the use of information to solve problems. Like most complex systems, the U.S. Army strives to attain an informational advantage over its opponents. However, according to contemporary operational theory, concepts, and U.S. Army warfighting doctrine, the significance of this informational advantage is the rapid development and execution of singular, optimal solutions. Through a detailed analysis of how operational-level staffs organize and plan, against a model for measuring static versus dynamic information-use,...

Tactical level nuances between COIN by an external and an internal actor are barely distinguishable. The successful COIN practices for an external actor listed in FM 3-24 COIN manual of US Army include maintaining a constant, forward presence with the population, acquiring and disseminating accurate and timely intelligence, and avoiding overreaction to insurgent activity. These well recognized and established principles are also applicable to COIN conducted by internal actors. At the operational level, however, the context in which both the actors operate is fundamentally different. COIN...

Hungary has hardly begun the development process of her own special operations capability (SOC). In a way, the Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF) is in an advantageous position. There are role models, examples and proven methods available to adopt from the experiences of its coalitional partners. At the same time, however, there are not even comparable amounts of resources available, and frequently, economic considerations easily override professional ones in the life of the small and still vulnerable Hungarian Special Operations Forces (HUNSOF). The HDF may endanger the capabilities of HUNSOF by...

This monograph addresses the perplexing issue of ensuring US security strategy is coherently mated with emerging defense doctrines. America's current security strategy, "engagement," is inherently dynamic in nature. Consequently, it has surfaced four defense related issues: mission profiles beyond the design of US armed forces, debate over the role of US armed forces within an "engagement" construct, debate over the future nature of US Security Policy and doctrinal changes by the Armed forces to meet the demands generated by "engagement." This monograph investigates the challenges facing the...

Ethical failures during the current era of persistent conflict have had significant operational costs. To minimize the effects of these operational costs, leaders must morally asses their forces and strive to implement programs to minimize future ethical failures while developing systems which promote learning from failures which occur. Fundamental development and implementation of ethics is crucial to minimize the risk of future ethical failures. While the artifacts of the Army Ethic fall under the purview of Strategic leaders, development of ethics within operational units and the follow-on...

After the United States (U.S.) Coalition forces invaded Iraq, the transition to stability operations has been difficult for the U.S. Coalition forces. One method used by the 1st Cavalry Division, in 2004, was to develop logical lines of operations that provided units with methods and guidance to accomplish key tasks in the stability operations phase. Under the essential services line of operations a concept that was implemented to help win the hearts and minds of the local Iraqi population was the sewage, water, electricity, and trash program also known as SWET. SWET became known as the...