Examining the Effectiveness of SWET and the Sons of SWET in OIF

ISBN-13: 9781479281503 / Angielski / Miękka / 2012 / 52 str.

Us Army Major Dawson a. Plummer; School Of Advanced Military Studies

Opis

After the United States (U.S.) Coalition forces invaded Iraq, the transition to stability operations has been difficult for the U.S. Coalition forces. One method used by the 1st Cavalry Division, in 2004, was to develop logical lines of operations that provided units with methods and guidance to accomplish key tasks in the stability operations phase. Under the essential services line of operations a concept that was implemented to help win the hearts and minds of the local Iraqi population was the sewage, water, electricity, and trash program also known as SWET. SWET became known as the primary focus for not only rebuilding and improving key infrastructure, but was perceived as the solution to winning the peace in Iraq. The SWET metrics program was adopted by follow-on units and executed all over Iraq. The SWET metrics were constantly monitored by higher headquarters and were even utilized to predict the level of pacification and acceptance of the local population. The purpose of this monograph is to determine how effective SWET was when being utilized during counterinsurgency operations in Iraq. This will be accomplished by conducting a historical comparison with a similar infrastructure rebuilding program in Vietnam, examining the different modifications made to SWET by follow-on units, and identifying the Iraqi local population opinions within each province concerning how they were affected by the U.S. Coalition forces execution of full spectrum operations. This monograph will prove that the SWET concept alone is not the ideal frame work for all of Iraq. In addition, SWET and the sons of SWET concepts are not enough to determine stability, dislodge insurgents from a population, address the underlying causes of an insurgency, or win the support of a local population. Finally, SWET is a concept which must be used with other counterinsurgency doctrine in order to win over the local population.