Laffont examines the incentive problems created by delegating economic policy to self-interested politicians and the blurry line between flexibility of decision-making and discretion to pursue personal agendas.
Laffont examines the incentive problems created by delegating economic policy to self-interested politicians and the blurry line between flexibility o...
These books comprise papers examining the latest developments in economic theory given at the Sixth World Congress of the Econometric Society in Barcelona in August 1990. They are the latest in a series of collections that cover the most active fields in economic theory over a five year period. With papers from the world's leading specialists, the books give the reader a unique survey of the most recent advances in economic theory.
These books comprise papers examining the latest developments in economic theory given at the Sixth World Congress of the Econometric Society in Barce...
This book comprises the second volume of papers presented at the Sixth World congress of the Econometric Society in Barcelona in August 1990. With papers from the world's leading specialists, it gives the reader a unique survey of the most recent advances in economic theory.
This book comprises the second volume of papers presented at the Sixth World congress of the Econometric Society in Barcelona in August 1990. With pap...
Providing the first theoretical analysis of regulation of public services for less developed countries (LDCs), Jean-Jacques Laffont demonstrates how the debate between price-cap regulation and cost of service regulation is affected by the characteristics of LDCs. Laffont develops a new theory of regulation with limited enforcement capabilities, and discusses the delicate issue of access pricing in view of LDCs' specificities. His evaluation of the different ways to organize the regulatory institutions makes a significant contribution to the field.
Providing the first theoretical analysis of regulation of public services for less developed countries (LDCs), Jean-Jacques Laffont demonstrates how t...
These three elegant essays develop principles central to the understanding of the diverse ways in which imperfect information affects the distribution of resources, incentives, and the evaluation of economic policy. The first concerns the special role that information plays in the allocation process when it is possible to improve accuracy through private investment. The common practice of hiring "experts" whose information is presumably much better than their clients' is analyzed. Issues of cooperative behavior when potential group members possess diverse pieces of information are...
These three elegant essays develop principles central to the understanding of the diverse ways in which imperfect information affects the distribut...
Laffont examines the incentive problems created by delegating economic policy to self-interested politicians and the blurry line between flexibility of decision-making and discretion to pursue personal agendas.
Laffont examines the incentive problems created by delegating economic policy to self-interested politicians and the blurry line between flexibility o...
