Incentives and Political Economy

ISBN-13: 9780198294245 / Angielski / Twarda / 2000 / 272 str.

Jean-Jacques Laffont

Opis

Laffont examines the incentive problems created by delegating economic policy to self-interested politicians and the blurry line between flexibility of decision-making and discretion to pursue personal agendas.

Recenzje

deals with the subject in a refreshing piecemeal approach that will allow researchers to embed elements of the theory into their favourite political economy models.

O autorze

Jean-Jacques Laffont is Professor of Economics at the University of Toulouse and director of the Institut d'Economie Industrielle (IDEI). His recent research focuses on regulation, political economy, and development. Winner of the Yrjoe Jahnsson award in 1993, he was President of the Econometric Society in 1992 and President of the European Economic Association in 1998.