This book presents research on recent developments in collective decision-making. With contributions from leading scholars from a variety of disciplines, it provides an up-to-date overview of applications in social choice theory, welfare economics, and industrial organization. The contributions address, amongst others, topics such as measuring power, the manipulability of collective decisions, and experimental approaches. Applications range from analysis of the complicated institutional rules of the European Union to responsibility-based allocation of cartel damages or the design of webpage...

This book provides a comprehensive mathematical description and analysis of the delegate allocation processes in the US Democratic and Republican presidential primaries, focusing on the role of apportionment methods and the effect of thresholds—the minimum levels of support required to receive delegates.  The analysis involves a variety of techniques, including theoretical arguments, simplicial geometry, Monte Carlo simulation, and examination of presidential primary data from 2004 to 2020.The book is divided into two parts: Part I defines the classical apportionment problem and explains...

This textbook is Volume 1 of a two-volume set on the axiomatics of economic design. Its central argument is that economic institutions are not God-given: they are man-made. Their ultimate goal is to promote social welfare. The book describes the axiomatic approach to design. It consists in the formulation of criteria of desirability of solution mappings, and of the examination of their logical implications when imposed in various combinations. Its goal is to identify as precisely as possible the line that separates those combinations of desiderata that are compatible and those that are not....