Based on a detailed analysis of newly declassified documents, this book reveals the full and fascinating story of Anglo-American nuclear relations from 1957 to 1962. This period saw the creation of a close and exclusive relationship of nuclear collaboration between Britain and the United States: an agreement was formed on atomic cooperation, facilities for U.S. nuclear submarines were established in the U.K., and U.S. missiles (including Thor and Polaris) were sold for use in the British strategic submarine force. Ian Clark argues that this partnership, though special, was fraught with...

This book deals with the crucially imprtant NATO crises of 1966-67--a period when a number of issues which had been developing for some time within NATO came to a head. It concentrates on the intensive reorientation of NATO strategy from the departure of France from the integrated military command to the adoption of Flexible Response and the Hermel report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance.
The author sets out the diplomacy of this period in a broader historical and theoretical context and provides four detailed, and related, case studies. The first case deals with problems of doctrine...

This comprehensive account of post-war British and German policies towards nuclear weapons shows how these interacted in the context of alliance strategy. The author gives a detailed account of major episodes in the evolution of the alliance and its doctrine, such as the MLF debate, the origins of flexible response, and theatre modernization programmes, and demonstrates how British and German interests impinged upon these episodes. In all this, one of the lesser-known nuclear relationships within the alliance comes vividly into focus.

Ambiguity and Deterrence focuses on the role of competing strategic beliefs in the formulation of British nuclear strategy between 1945 and 1964. Based on recently released documents, it is argued that the British approach to nuclear weapons during this formative period was characterized by paradox and ambiguity. The paradox was that while there was a widespread consensus in political and military circles in favour of nuclear deterrence, there were constant disagreements over the requirements of an effective deterrent policy. These disagreements centred on six main questions: whether...

During the 1950s nuclear weapons began to play an increasingly important role in Britain's defense policy. The development of thermonuclear bombs and assessments of the great destruction that would result from an exchange of nuclear warheads helped alter Britain's planning for war, and influenced the structure and deployment of her armed forces. In this study, Martin Navias seeks to analyze the significance of the 1957 White Paper on Defense in the context of British strategic planning during the mid-1950s. He assesses claims that the White Paper represented a culmination of trends already...