Walter J. Schultz illustrates the deficiencies of theories that purport to show that markets alone can provide the basis for efficiency. He argues that markets are not moral-free zones, and that achieving the economic common good does indeed require morality. He demonstrates that efficient outcomes of market interaction cannot be achieved without moral normative constraints and then goes on to specify a set of normative conditions that make these positive outcomes possible.

For several decades the work of Joel Feinberg has been the most influential in legal, political, and social philosophy in the English-speaking world. This volume honors that body of work by presenting fifteen original essays, many of them by leading legal and political philosophers, that explore the problems that have engaged Feinberg over the years. Among the topics covered are issues of autonomy, responsibility, and liability. It will be a collection of interest to anyone working in moral, legal, or political philosophy.

Do citizens have an obligation to obey the law? This book differs from standard approaches by shifting from the language of obedience (orders) to that of deference (normative judgments). Though the focus is on political obligation, Philip Soper approaches that issue indirectly by developing a more general account of when deference is due to the views of others. The book defends a more general theory of ethics; one whose scope extends beyond the question of political obligation to questions of duty in the case of law, promises, fair play and friendship.

Larry Alexander offers a skeptical appraisal of the claim that freedom of expression is a human right. He examines the various contexts in which a right to freedom of expression might be asserted and concludes that it cannot be supported in any of these contexts. Alexander argues that the legal protection affording freedom of expression is definitely of value, although the form such protection takes will vary with historical and cultural circumstances--and, ultimately, is not a matter of human rights.

According to the natural law account of practical rationality, the basic reasons for actions are basic goods that are grounded in the nature of human beings. Practical rationality aims to identify and characterize reasons for action and to explain how choice between actions worth performing can be appropriately governed by rational standards. Natural Law and Practical Rationality is a defense of a contemporary natural law theory of practical rationality, demonstrating its inherent plausibility and engaging systematically with rival egoist, consequentialist, Kantian and virtue accounts.

We live in a morally flawed world. Our lives are complicated by what other people do, and by the harms that flow from our social, economic, and political institutions. Our relations as individuals to these collective harms constitute the domain of complicity. This book examines the relationship between collective responsibility and individual guilt. It presents a rigorous philosophical account of the nature of our relations to the social groups in which we participate, and uses that account in a discussion of contemporary moral theory.