Wyniki wyszukiwania:

This volume examines just why and in what sense, Sir Karl Popper's view of empirical falsifiability as the distinguishing characteristic of science has found appeal among economists. The limitations of this tenet, both for a philosophy of science and as a guideline to economic inquiry, are examined, as are several of the proposed alternatives.

For much of the last three decades or more economic methodology has been dominated by the work of Karl Popper who advocated the position that science is what it is by virtue of its adherence to certain ideals. The methodology of science is therefore not empirical or descriptive, but rather a set of rules for producing rational' or objective' knowledge. This volume presents alternatives to an exclusively Popperian methodology: its purpose is not to reject Popper, but to show there are other ways of construing methodology.
The book is divided into three parts. Part I contains two critical...

For much of the last three decades or more economic methodology has been dominated by the work of Karl Popper who advocated the position that science is what it is by virtue of its adherence to certain ideals. The methodology of science is therefore not empirical or descriptive, but rather a set of rules for producing rational' or objective' knowledge. This volume presents alternatives to an exclusively Popperian methodology: its purpose is not to reject Popper, but to show there are other ways of construing methodology.
The book is divided into three parts. Part I contains two critical...