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The self for Kant is something real, and yet is neither appearance nor thing in itself, but rather has some third status. This book explains the 'third status' by identifying the self with intellectual action that does not arise in the progression of attending (and so is not appearance), but accompanies and unifies inner attending.

To be happy is to be emotionally and evaluatively satisfied with one's life according to a standard of satisfaction one can claim as one's own as a reasoning being. Since there is no definitive proof of what the standard of satisfaction is, being open to the devising and testing of standards by others is part of claiming one's own standard as a reasoning being. This open-ness is equivalent to being open to and hence respecting and caring for the pursuit of happiness of others. Since such respect and care is what it is to be moral, it follows that one cannot be happy without being moral.

Melnick explains the 'third status' of the self by identifying it with intellectual action that does not arise in the progression of attending (and so is not appearance), but accompanies and unifies inner attending. As so accompanying, it progresses with that attending and is therefore temporal - not a thing in itself.