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This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory -- including strategic form games, Nash equilibria, subgame perfection, repeated games, and games of incomplete information -- in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. The analytic material is accompanied by many applications, examples, and exercises. The theory of noncooperative games studies the behavior of agents in any situation where each agent's optimal choice may depend on a...

In October 2014, Jean Tirole capped a long career by scooping the Nobel Prize for Economic Science. Tirole's long career saw him make major contributions to industrial organization, game theory and financial theory and Dynamic Models of Oligopoly, co-authored with this long term collaborator Drew Fudenberg, was where it all began back in 1986. Originally published by Harwood Academic Publishers, the book paints a picture of an economy as an ever evolving and far from static system and stands as a document to the more nuanced and realistic approach to economic modelling which Tirole...

In economics, most noncooperative game theory has focused on equilibrium in games, especially Nash equilibrium and its refinements. The traditional explanation for when and why equilibrium arises is that it results from analysis and introspection by the players in a situation where the rules of the game, the rationality of the players, and the players' payoff functions are all common knowledge. Both conceptually and empirically, this theory has many problems.

In The Theory of Learning in Games Drew Fudenberg and David Levine develop an alternative explanation that equilibrium...