Wittgenstein: Mind and Will: Volume 4 of an Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations

ISBN-13: 9780631219866 / Angielski / Miękka / 2000 / 320 str.

Peter Hacker; P. M. S. Hacker

Opis

This fourth and final volume of the monumental commentary on Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations covers pp 428-693 of the book. Like the previous volumes, it consists of philosophical essays and exegesis.

Recenzje

"Anyone reading Philosophical Investigations would do well to keep it by their side, not only for its authoritative commentary on particular passages, but also for Hacker′s extremely illuminating essays on the themes of the last part of the book: one each on intentionality, induction, the arbitrariness of grammar, negation, methodology in philosophical psychology, memory and recognition the will, intention and the mythology of meaning." London Review of Books

"It is as good a commentary on the Investigations as seems humanly possible. This will reamin the definitive starting point for the forseeable future. Indeed, it must rank alongside the greatest contributions to philosophical scholarship (such as Ross on Aristotle or Vaihinger on Kant), since it combines, on a momentous scale, authoritative textual exegesis, philosophical insight, encyclopedic knowledge of the historical background and lucidity of expression. Hacker succeeds brilliantly in showing that these passages are essential to the discussion of language and linguistic meaning that is the leitmotif of the Investigations. The chapter on mental states and processes provides an excellent interpretation and defence of Wittgenstein′s approach to philosophical psychology, in particular of his denial that our psychological concepts constitute a ′folk psychology′ that must be replaced by a more scientific alternative. Similarly, the chapter on will is the most authoritative discussion yet of Wittgenstein′s fiendishly difficult treatment of that topic." Hans–Johann Glock, Times Higher Education Supplement

Spis treści

Acknowledgements.

Preface.

Abbreviations.

Analytical Commentary.

Part I: Intentionality: The Harmony Between Language and Reality (428–65):.

Introduction.

Intentionality.

1. Representation In Thought and Speech.

2. The Tractatus: Form and Content.

3. Repudiation of Causal Theories.

4. A Fresh Start.

5. Dispelling The Confusions (Identity and Surrogationalism; Thinking What Is Not The Case; Knowing What One Thinks; Satisfaction and Fitting; Anticipating The Future; Understanding and Interpreting).

Part II: Justification By Experience (466–90):.

Introduction.

Inductive Reasoning.

6. The Tractatus.

7. Reasons and Reasoning.

8. Justifying Induction.

Part III: The Immanence of Meaning and The Bounds of Sense (491–570):.

Introduction.

The Arbitrariness of Grammar and The Bounds of Sense.

9. Grammar Justified.

10. Grammar Unjustified.

11. Illusory Determinants of The Bounds of Sense.

12. The Arbitrariness of Grammar and The Immanence of Meaning.

13. Traversing The Bounds of Sense.

A Note on Negation 1.

Frege and Russell.

14. The Tractatus Criticisms of Frege.

15. The Meaning Body of Negation.

Part IV: Mental States and Processes (571–610): .

Introduction.

Methodology In Philosophical Psychology.

16. Psychology: A ′Young Science′ Or ′Experimental Methods and Conceptual Confusion′?.

17. The Descriptive Method In Philosophical Psychology.

18. The Concepts of Psychology and Their Role In Human Life.

19. The Plan For The Treatment of Psychological Concepts.

20. The Preferred Strategy.

Memory and Recognition.

21. The Prevailing Tradition.

22. Memory: Reading The Past Off The Present.

23. Memory Experiences and Processes.

24. Memory Traces and Psycho–Physical Parallelism.

25. Recognition.

26. Plus Ca Change.

Part V: The Will (611–28): .

Introduction.

Willing and The Nature of Voluntary Action.

27. Agency and Action.

28. The Prevalent Tradition.

29. ′My Kinaesthetic Sensations Advise Me′.

30. Is Willing Too Merely An Experience?.

31. Diagnosis.

32. Fantasies of The Will. (The Innervationist and Ideo–Motor Theories; Trying; Causation of Action).

33. Voluntary and Involuntary Action.

Part VI: Intention and Recollecting One′s Intention (629–60): .

Introduction.

Intending.

34. Stage Setting.

35. Wittgenstein: Remembering What One Was Going To.

36. Wittgenstein: Category Distinctions.

37. Intention and Prediction.

38. The Language Game of ′I Intend′.

Part VII: Meaning Something (661–93): .

Introduction.

The Mythology of Meaning Something.

39. A Puzzle About 661–93.

40. Misconceptions About Meaning In The Notebooks and The Tractatus.

41. The Retrospective Reconstruction of The Mythology of Meaning.

42. The Change of Heart.

43. Categorial Differentiations.

44. Meaning What One Says.

45. Reassembling The Jigsaw.

O autorze

P. M. S. Hacker is Fellow of St. John′s College, Oxford. He is author of Insight and Iffusion (1972, revised ed. 1986), Appearance and Reality (Blackwell, 1987) and Wittgenstein: Meaning and Mind (Blackwell, 1990). He edited The Renaissance of Gravure: The Art of S. W. Hayter (1988), Graure and Grace: the Engravings of Roger Vieillard (1993) and co–edited a Festschrift for H. L. A. Hart together with J. Raz. Law, Morality and Society (1977). He has written five books with G. P. Baker, Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning (Blackwell, 1980), Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity (Blackwell, 1985), Frege: Logical Excavations (Blackwell and Oxford University Press, New York, 1984), Language, Sense and Nonsense (Blackwell, 1984), and Scepticism, Rules and Language, (Blackwell, 1984).

Blurb

This fourth and final volume of the monumental commentary on Wittgenstein′s Philosophical Investigations covers pp. 428–693 of the book. Like the previous volumes, it consists of philosophical essays and exegesis. The nine essays cover all the major themes of this concluding part of Wittgenstein′s masterpiece: intentionality, inductive reasoning, the arbitrariness of grammar and the bounds of sense, negation, methodology in philosophical psychology, memory and recognition, willing and the nature of voluntary action, intending, and the mythology of meaning something. Wittgenstein′s writings on some of these themes have been relatively neglected, and the analytical essays on the topics of intentionality, the arbitrariness of grammar, and the will shed fresh light upon his characteristically original contributions to these subjects, which are highly relevant to current debates. The exegesis clarifies and evaluates Wittgenstein′s arguments, drawing extensively on all the unpublished papers, examining the evolution of his ideas in manuscript sources and definitively settling many controversies about the interpretation of the published text.

This commentary, like its predecessors, is indispensable for the study of Wittgenstein and is essential reading for students of philosophy of mind and philosophy of language.

The completion of the Commentary will be followed by a historical monograph entitled Wittgenstein′s Place in Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy, which will give an overview of Wittgenstein′s achievement, locate his work within the mainstream of analytic philosophy and examine his influence upon the development of Cambridge analysis in the interwar years, upon the Vienna Circle and upon postwar Oxford analytic philosophy.