Industrial Organization: Practice Exercises with Answer Keys

ISBN-13: 9783031386343 / Angielski

Pak-Sing Choi; Eric Dunaway; Felix Mu?oz-Garcia

Spis treści

1. Monopoly.- 2. Simultaneous quantity competition.- 3. Simultaneous price competition.- 4. Sequential competition.- 5. Regulating imperfectly competitive markets.- 6. R&D incentives.- 7. Mergers and Collusion.- 8. Bundling incentives.- 9. Incomplete information, signaling, and competition.- 10. Networks and switching costs.

O autorze

Pak-Sing Choi is assistant professor of economics at the Graduate Institute of Industrial Economics of National Central University, Taiwan. His research focuses on the effect of environmental regulation on industrial organization under asymmetric information.

Eric Dunaway is assistant professor of economics at Wabash College (US).  His research focuses on industrial organization, game theory, behavioral and public economics.

Felix Munoz-Garcia is professor of economics at Washington State University (US). His research focuses on industrial organization, game theory, and their applications to environmental regulation in contexts where firms, government agencies, or both, are imperfectly informed.

Blurb

Revised and updated for the second edition, this textbook presents over 100 exercises on industrial organization with detailed answer keys. While most textbooks on industrial organization focus on theory and empirical findings, this textbook offers practical examples and exercises helping predict firm behavior in different industries. The book emphasizes the game-theoretic tools used in each type of exercise, so students can systematically apply them to other markets, forms of competition, or information environments where firms, consumers, and regulating agencies interact.

The book begins with examples that analyze different models of firm behavior and interaction; starting with monopoly and moving through the Cournot model of simultaneous quantity competition, the Bertrand model simultaneous price competition, and sequential competition. The following chapters apply game-theoretic tools to situations of increasing complexity: regulation; R&D incentives; mergers and collusion; bundling incentives; incomplete information, signaling, and competition; networks and switching costs. In addition to providing algebraic simplifications, some chapters also offer the unique feature of worked exercises based on published journal articles by leading scholars in the field. Finally, exercises are ranked according to their difficulty, with a letter (A-C) next to the exercise number, which allows students to pace their studies and instructors to structure their classes accordingly. The second edition contains additional exercises optimized for study at the upper undergraduate level.

Providing a rigorous, yet practical introduction to the field of industrial organization, this textbook is appropriate for advanced undergraduate and graduate students in economics and finance.