CBRN Protection: Managing the Threat of Chemical, Biological, Radioactive and Nuclear Weapons

ISBN-13: 9783527324132 / Angielski / Twarda / 2012 / 514 str.

Andre Richardt; Bernd Niemeyer; Frank Sabath

Opis

Originating in the armed forces of the early 20th century, weapons based on chemical, biological or nuclear agents have become an everpresent threat that has not vanished after the end of the cold war. Since the technology to produce these agents is nowadays available to
many countries and organizations, including those with terrorist aims, civil authorities across the world need to prepare against incidents involving these agents and train their personnel accordingly.

As an introductory text on NBC CBRN weapons and agents, this book leads the reader from the scientific basics to the current threats and strategies to prepare against them. After an introductory part on the history of NBC CBRN weapons and their international control, the three classes of nuclear/radiological, biological, and chemical weapons are introduced, focusing on agents and delivery vehicles. Current methods
for the rapid detection of NBC CBRN agents are introduced, and the principles of physical protection of humans and structures are explained.

The final parts addresses more general issues of risk management, preparedness and response management, as the set of tools that authorities and civil services will be needed in a future CBRN scenario as well as the likely future scenarios that authorities and civil services will be faced with in the coming years.

This book is a must-have for Health Officers, Public Health Agencies, and Military Authorities.

Spis treści

Foreword XV

Preface XVII

About the Editors XIX

List of Contributors XXIII

Part I History and Treaties in CBRN Warfare and Terrorism 1

1 A Glance Back Myths and Facts about CBRN Incidents 3
Andre Richardt and Frank Sabath

1.1 Introduction 3

1.2 History of Chemical Warfare 4

1.2.1 Chemical Warfare Agents in Ancient Times 5

1.2.2 Birth of Modern Chemical Warfare Agents and Their Use in World War I 5

1.2.3 Chemical Warfare Agents between the Two World Wars 8

1.2.3.1 The Italian Ethiopian War 8

1.2.3.2 Japanese Invasion of China 9

1.2.3.3 First Nerve Agents 9

1.2.4 Chemical Warfare Agents in World War II 9

1.2.5 Chemical Warfare Agents during the Cold War 10

1.2.6 Chemical Warfare Agents Used in Terrorism 11

1.2.7 Conclusions and Outlook 12

1.3 Introduction to Biological Warfare 13

1.3.1 Most Harmful Pandemics in History 14

1.3.2 Biological Warfare Agents in Ancient Times BC 16

1.3.3 Biological Warfare Agents in the Middle Ages to World War I 18

1.3.4 From World War I to World War II the Beginning of Scientifically Based Biological Weapons Research 18

1.3.5 From the End of World War II to the 1980 the Great Bioweapons Programs 20

1.3.6 From the 1980 Up Today the Emerging of Bioterrorism 20

1.3.7 Conclusions and Outlook 20

1.4 Introduction to Radiological and Nuclear Warfare 22

1.4.1 Discovery of Nuclear Fission 23

1.4.2 Manhattan Project Development of the First Fission Weapons 25

1.4.3 Nuclear Arms Race 29

1.4.4 Status of World Nuclear Forces 35

1.4.5 Radiological Warfare and Nuclear Terrorism 35

1.4.6 Conclusions and Outlook 37

References 37

2 International Treaties Only a Matter for Diplomats? 39
Martin Schaarschmidt

2.1 Introduction to the Minefield of Negotiations 39

2.1.1 Arms Reduction and Prohibition of Use 41

2.1.2 Arms Control and International Controlling Bodies 42

2.1.3 Nonproliferation 42

2.2 Why It Is so Difficult to Implement International Regulations? 42

2.2.1 Trust Devoid of Trust Every Effort Is Useless 43

2.2.2 Negotiation Special Skills Are Required 43

2.2.3 Dual Use Good or Bad Technology? 44

2.2.4 Verification an Instrument for Trust Building 44

2.2.5 Technological Advancement Gain of Momentum 45

2.3 Historic Development of Treaties the Link to the Incidents 46

2.4 Today s System of Treaties a Global Network 47

2.4.1 The Geneva Conventions the Backbone for Further Treaties 49

2.4.2 Deployment System for Weapons Control the Carrier Systems 50

2.4.3 Biological and Chemical Weapons 51

2.4.4 Chemical Weapons Convention 1993 and Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) 52

2.4.5 Implications of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) 53

2.5 Nuclear Weapons 54

2.5.1 Nonproliferation 55

2.5.2 Disarmament 56

2.5.2.1 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks/Treaty (SALT) 56

2.5.2.2 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) 57

2.5.2.3 Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT) 2003 58

2.5.3 Test–Ban and Civil Use 58

2.5.4 Nuclear–Weapon–Free Zones 60

2.6 Organizations 63

2.7 Conclusions and Where Does the Road Lead? 64

References 64

Part II CBRN Characteristics Is There Something Inimitable? 67

3 Chemical Agents Small Molecules with Deadly Properties 69
Hans–J¨urgen Altmann, Silke Oelze, and Bernd Niemeyer

3.1 Are Special Properties Required for Chemical Warfare Agents? 69

3.2 How can we Classify Chemical Warfare Agents? 71

3.2.1 A: Physicochemical Behavior 72

3.2.2 B: Route of Entry into the Body 74

3.2.3 C: Organs to be Affected 75

3.2.4 D: Physiological Effects on Humans 76

3.2.5 E: Identification According to the NATO Code 78

3.3 Properties of Chemical Warfare Agents 78

3.3.1 Blister Agents (Vesicants) 78

3.3.2 Arsenicals 83

3.3.3 Blood Agents 85

3.3.4 Tear Agents (Lachrymators) 89

3.3.5 Vomiting Agents (Sternutators) 92

3.3.6 Nerve Agents 94

3.4 Choking and Irritant Agents 97

3.5 Incapacitating Agents 99

3.6 Dissemination Systems of Chemical Warfare Agents 99

3.7 Conclusions and Outlook 101

References 101

4 Characteristics of Biological Warfare Agents Diversity of Biology 103
Birgit H¨ulseweh

4.1 What Is Special? 104

4.2 Types of Biological Agents 104

4.2.1 Bacteria 105

4.2.2 Viruses 107

4.2.3 Toxins 108

4.2.4 Fungi 109

4.3 Risk Classification of Biological and Biological Warfare Agents 110

4.3.1 Risk Classification of Potential Biological Warfare Agents 111

4.4 Routes of Entry 114

4.5 Origin, Spreading, and Availability 118

4.5.1 Methods of Delivery 120

4.6 The Biological Event Borderline to Pandemics, Endemics, and Epidemics 121

4.7 The Bane of Biotechnology Genetically Engineered Pathogens 121

4.8 Conclusions and Outlook 123

References 123

5 Characteristics of Nuclear and Radiological Weapons 125
Ronald Rambousky and Frank Sabath

5.1 Introduction to Nuclear Explosions 126

5.1.1 Nuclear Fission 126

5.1.1.1 Critical Mass for a Fission Chain 127

5.1.2 Nuclear Fusion 128

5.1.3 Weapon Design 129

5.1.3.1 Pure Fission Weapon 129

5.1.3.2 Fusion–Boosted Fission Weapon 130

5.1.3.3 Thermonuclear Weapons 130

5.1.4 Effects of a Nuclear Explosion 131

5.2 Direct Effects 133

5.2.1 Thermal Radiation 133

5.2.2 Blast and Shock 137

5.2.3 Initial Nuclear Radiation 140

5.2.4 Residual Nuclear Radiation 145

5.3 Indirect Effects 149

5.3.1 Transient Radiation Effects on Electronics (TREE) 149

5.3.2 Nuclear Electromagnetic Pulse (NEMP) 152

5.3.2.1 Generation of Electric Field 152

5.3.2.2 NEMP in High–Altitude Burst 153

5.3.2.3 Early Component of NEMP (E1) 154

5.3.2.4 Intermediate Component of NEMP (E2) 156

5.3.2.5 Late Time Component of NEMP (E3) 157

5.4 Radiological Weapons 159

5.4.1 Radioactive Material and Radiological Weapons 160

5.4.2 Impacts of Radiological Weapons 162

5.4.2.1 Radiological Exposure Device 162

5.4.2.2 Radiological Dispersal Device 162

References 165

Part III CBRN Sensors Key Technology for an Effective CBRN Countermeasure Strategy 167

6 Why Are Reliable CBRN Detector Technologies Needed? 169
Birgit H¨ulseweh, Hans–J¨urgen Marschall, Ronald Rambousky, and Andre Richardt

6.1 Introduction 169

6.2 A Concept to Track CBRN Substances 170

6.3 Low–Level Exposure and Operational Risk Management 175

6.4 Conclusions and Outlook 177

References 178

7 Analysis of Chemical Warfare Agents Searching for Molecules 179
Andre Richardt, Martin Jung, and Bernd Niemeyer

7.1 Analytical Chemistry the Scientific Basis for Searching Molecules 180

7.2 Standards for Chemical Warfare Agent Sensor Systems and Criteria for Deployment 182

7.2.1 Recommended Chemical Agent Concentration and Requirements for Chemical Warfare Agent Sensors 182

7.2.2 Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGLs) for Chemical Warfare Agents 183

7.3 False Alarm Rate and Limit of Sensitivity 184

7.4 Technologies for Chemical Warfare Agent Sensor Systems 185

7.4.1 Mass Spectrometry 187

7.4.2 Atomic Absorption Spectrometry (AAS) 190

7.4.3 Ion Mobility Spectrometry (IMS) 192

7.4.4 Colorimetric Technology 197

7.4.5 Photoionization Technology (PI) 198

7.4.6 Electrochemical Technologies 199

7.4.7 Infrared (IR) Spectroscopy 200

7.5 Testing of Chemical Warfare Agent Detectors 203

7.6 Conclusions and Future Developments 206

References 208

8 Detection and Analysis of Biological Agents 211
Birgit H¨ulseweh and Hans–J¨urgen Marschall

8.1 What Makes the Difference? 212

8.2 The Ideal Detection and Identification Platform 215

8.3 Bioaerosols: Particulate and Biological Background 216

8.4 Aerosol Detection A Tool for Threat Monitoring 217

8.4.1 Cloud Detection 217

8.4.2 Radio Detecting and Ranging (RADAR) and Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) 219

8.4.3 Aerosol Particle Sizer (APS), Flame Photometry, and Fluorescence Aerosol Particle Sizer (FLAPS) 220

8.4.4 Detector Layout Topology, Sensitivity, and Response 222

8.5 Sampling of Biological Agents 223

8.5.1 Aerosol Sampling 224

8.5.1.1 Surface Sampling 227

8.6 Identification of Biological Warfare Agents 229

8.6.1 Immunological Methods Based on Enzyme–Linked Immunosorbent Assay (ELISA) 229

8.6.2 Molecular Methods 233

8.6.3 Chemical and Physical Identification 236

8.7 Developing and Upcoming Technologies 238

8.8 Conclusions 239

References 240

9 Measurement of Ionizing Radiation 243
Ronald Rambousky

9.1 Why Is Detection of Ionizing Radiation So Important? 244

9.2 Physical Quantities used to Describe Radioactivity and Ionizing Radiation 248

9.2.1 Activity 248

9.2.2 Absorbed Dose 249

9.2.3 Equivalent Dose 250

9.2.4 Effective Dose Equivalent 250

9.2.5 Operational Dose Quantities 250

9.3 Different Measuring Tasks Concerning Ionizing Radiation 251

9.3.1 Personal Dosimetry 252

9.3.2 Measuring the Ambient Dose Rate 252

9.3.3 Searching for Gamma– and Neutron–Sources 252

9.3.4 Surface Contamination Measurements 253

9.3.5 Nuclide Identification 253

9.3.6 Measurement of Activity 254

9.3.7 Detection of Radioactive Aerosols 255

9.4 Basics of Radiation Detectors 256

9.4.1 Gas–Filled Detectors 256

9.4.2 Luminescence Detectors 259

9.4.3 Photo–emulsion 260

9.4.4 Scintillators 260

9.4.5 Semiconductor Detectors 262

9.4.6 Neutron Detectors 265

9.5 Gamma Dose Rate and Detection of Gamma Radiation 266

9.5.1 Metrological Dose Rate Measurements 266

9.5.2 Energy Response of a Dose–Rate Detector 267

9.5.3 Quantitative Detection 268

9.6 Conclusions and Outlook 271

References 272

Part IV Technologies for Physical Protection 273

10 Filter Technology Clean Air is Required 275
Andre Richardt and Thomas Dawert

10.1 Filters Needed Technology Equipment for Collective and Individual Protection 275

10.2 General Considerations 276

10.3 What are the Principles for Filtration and Air–Cleaning? 278

10.3.1 Particulate Filtration 279

10.3.2 Gas–Phase Air Cleaning 283

10.4 Test Methods 286

10.4.1 Particle filter testing methods 288

10.4.2 Gasfilter tests 289

10.5 Selection Process for CBRN Filters 290

10.6 Conclusions and Outlook 292

References 293

11 Individual Protective Equipment Do You Know What to Wear? 295
Karola Hagner and Friedrich Hesse

11.1 Basics of Individual Protection 296

11.2 Which Challenges for Individual Protection Equipment (IPE) Can Be Identified? 296

11.3 The Way to Design Individual Protective Equipment 298

11.4 Function 299

11.5 Ergonomics a Key Element for Individual Protection Equipment 301

11.6 Donning and Doffing Training Is Required 305

11.7 Overview of IPE Items They Have to Act in Concert 306

11.7.1 Respiratory Protection 307

11.7.2 Respirator Design 310

11.7.2.1 Air–Purifying Escape Respirator (APER) with CBRN Protection 313

11.7.3 Air–Purifying Respirators (APRs) with Canisters for Ambient Air 314

11.7.3.1 Respirators with Blower Support (Powered Air–Purifying Respirator, PAPR) 315

11.7.3.2 Respirators with Self–contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) 316

11.7.4 Canisters 317

11.7.5 Body Protection 317

11.7.6 Protective Suits 318

11.7.6.1 Permeable Protective Suits 319

11.7.6.2 Impermeable Protective Suits 320

11.7.7 Protective Gloves 322

11.7.8 Protective Footwear 323

11.7.9 Pouches 323

11.7.10 Ponchos 324

11.7.11 Self–Aid Kit 324

11.7.12 Casualty Protection 325

11.8 Quality Assurance 326

11.9 Workplace Safety 327

11.10 Future Prospects 327

References 328

12 Collective Protection A Secure Area in a Toxic Environment 331
Andre Richardt and Bernd Niemeyer

12.1 Why Is Collective Protection of Interest? 332

12.2 Collective Protection Systems Required for Different Scenarios 337

12.3 Basic Design 341

12.3.1 Air Filtration Unit (AFU) and Auxiliary Equipment 342

12.3.2 Environmental Control Unit (ECU) 344

12.3.3 Contamination Control Area (CCA) 345

12.3.4 Airlock the Bottleneck for Ingress and Egress 346

12.3.5 Toxic–Free Area (TFA) 348

12.4 Conclusions and Outlook 348

References 349

Part V Cleanup after a CBRN Event 351

13 Decontamination of Chemical Warfare Agents What is Thorough? 353
Hans J¨urgen Altmann, Martin Jung, and Andre Richardt

13.1 What Is Decontamination? 353

13.2 Dispersal and Fate of Chemical Warfare Agents 354

13.3 Decontamination Media for Chemical Warfare Agents 356

13.3.1 Aqueous–Based Decontaminants 358

13.3.1.1 Water 358

13.3.1.2 Water–Soluble Decontamination Chemicals 359

13.3.2 Non–aqueous Decontaminants 359

13.3.3 Heterogeneous Liquid Media 362

13.3.3.1 Macroemulsions (Emulsions) 362

13.3.3.2 Microemulsions 366

13.3.3.3 Foams and Gels 367

13.4 Selected Chemical Warfare Agents and Decont Reaction Schemes 369

13.4.1 Sulfur Mustard (HD) 370

13.4.1.1 Hydrolysis 370

13.4.2 Sarin (GB) 370

13.5 Soman (GD) 372

13.6 VX 372

13.7 Catalysis in Decontamination 373

13.8 Decont Procedures 375

13.8.1 Generalities 376

13.8.2 Equipment Decontamination 376

13.8.2.1 Wet Procedures 376

13.8.2.2 Dry Procedures 378

13.8.2.3 Clothing and Protective Clothing 378

13.8.2.4 Decontamination of Personnel 379

13.8.2.5 Rapid Decontamination of Personnel and Personal Gear 379

13.8.2.6 Thorough Decontamination of Personnel 380

13.9 Conclusions and Outlook 380

References 381

14 Principles and Practice of Disinfection of Biological Warfare Agents How Clean is Clean Enough? 383
Andre Richardt and Birgit H¨ulseweh

14.1 General Principles of Disinfection and Decontamination 384

14.1.1 Definition of Terms 384

14.1.2 Physical Methods of Disinfection 385

14.1.3 Chemical Methods of Disinfection 385

14.2 Mechanisms of Action of Biocides against Microorganisms 385

14.2.1 Chemicals for Disinfection 386

14.2.2 Fumigation Well–Known for Decontamination of Objects 388

14.2.2.1 Fumigation with Ethylene Oxide 388

14.2.2.2 Fumigation with Chlorine Dioxide Gas 388

14.2.2.3 Fumigation with Formaldehyde Gas 389

14.2.2.4 Vaporized Hydrogen–Peroxide (VHP) 389

14.3 Levels of Disinfection 390

14.4 Biological Target Sites of Selected Biocides 393

14.4.1 Viral Target Sites 393

14.4.2 Bacterial Target Sites 394

14.5 The Spores Problem 395

14.6 Inactivation as Kinetic Process 399

14.7 Evaluation of Antimicrobial Efficiency 401

14.8 Carrier Tests versus Suspension Tests 403

14.9 Resistance to Biocide Inactivation a Growing Concern 405

14.9.1 Resistance of Viruses 406

14.9.2 Resistance of Bacteria 407

14.10 New and Emerging Technologies for Disinfection 408

14.11 Is Clean Clean Enough or How Clean Is Clean Enough ? 408

References 409

15 Radiological/Nuclear Decontamination Reduce the Risk 411
Nikolaus Schneider

15.1 Why Is Radiological/Nuclear Decontamination So Special? 412

15.2 Contamination 414

15.2.1 Nuclear Weapons 414

15.2.1.1 Nuclear Fallout Contaminates the Ground 414

15.2.1.2 Rainout/Washout 415

15.2.2 Radiological Contaminations Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) 416

15.3 Decontamination 418

15.3.1 Decontamination Efficiency Calculation 418

15.3.2 Decontamination Procedures for RN Response 420

15.3.3 RN Decontamination Agents 421

15.3.3.1 Surfactant 422

15.3.3.2 Chelating Agent 424

15.3.4 Specific Decon Processes, Alternative Procedures 424

15.3.4.1 Spraying/Extraction Systems 425

15.3.4.2 Surface Ablation Techniques 426

15.4 Conclusions and Outlook 428

References 429

Part VI CBRN Risk Management Are We Prepared to Respond? 431

16 Preparedness 433
Marc–Michael Blum, Andre Richardt, and Kai Kehe

16.1 Introduction to Risk Management 433

16.2 Key Elements Influencing a Counter–CBRN Strategy 436

16.3 A Special Strategy for CBRN 438

16.3.1 Chemical Threats 440

16.3.2 Biological Threats 443

16.3.3 Radiological Threats 447

16.3.4 Nuclear Threats 450

16.4 Proliferation Prevention 456

16.5 Active Countermeasures 458

16.6 If Things Get Real: Responding to a CBRN Event 459

16.6.1 Fundamentals of Installation of a Response 459

16.6.2 Detection, Reconnaissance, and Surveillance 461

16.6.3 Risk Assessment 462

16.6.4 CBRN Warning and Reporting 464

16.6.5 Command and Control, Communication 465

16.6.6 Technical Response 466

16.6.7 Medical Response 468

16.6.8 Risk Communication 470

16.6.9 Medical Support and Post–disaster Recovery 472

16.7 Research 473

16.8 Aftermath Action Lessons Learned 474

16.9 Conclusions and Outlook 475

References 476

Index 479

O autorze

Andre Richardt is the head of Biological and Chemical Decontamination at the German Armed Forces Institute for Protection Technologies in Munster, Germany. He is also a lecturer at the Helmut Schmidt University in Hamburg, Germany.

Birgit Hülseweh is a senior scientist at the German Armed Forces Institute for Protection Technologies. In addition to her research activities she is lecturing on BC–detection at the Helmut–Schmidt–University in Hamburg, Germany.

Bernd Niemeyer is Professor for Process Engineering at the Helmut Schmidt University in Hamburg, Germany and head of a research group at the GKSS National Research Center in Geesthacht, Germany.

Frank Sabath is the head of the Electromagnetic Effects Branch of the German Armed Forces Institute for Protection Technologies. He is also lecturing at the Leibniz University in Hannover, Germany.