Kategoria BISAC: Philosophy >> Movements - Idealism

Kant declared that philosophy began in 1781 with his Critique of Pure Reason. In 1806 Hegel announced that philosophy had now been completed. Eckart Forster examines the reasons behind these claims and assesses the steps that led in such a short time from Kant's "beginning" to Hegel's "end." He concludes that, in an unexpected yet significant sense, both Kant and Hegel were indeed right.

"Presents a novel interpretation of the development of German idealism that is rich in both historical depth and philosophical insight...Forster sets forth a historically nuanced and...

Hegel's philosophy of history--which most critics view as a theory of inevitable progress toward modern European civilization--is widely regarded as a failure today. In Does History Make Sense? Terry Pinkard argues that Hegel's understanding of historical progress is not the kind of teleological or progressivist account that its detractors claim, but is based on a subtle understanding of human subjectivity.

Pinkard shows that for Hegel a break occurred between modernity and all that came before, when human beings found a new way to make sense of themselves as rational,...

"Hegel and scepticism" remains an intriguing topic directly concerning the logical and methodological core of Hegel's system. A series of contributions is unfolding around a keynote paper by Klaus Vieweg, which tries to understand and restate the limits and the content of the relationship between Hegels philosophy and scepticism. Various Hegel readers with different concerns are dealing with Hegel's strategy in a large range of theoretical areas.

This essential Handbook provides a varied investigation of the work of Immanuel Kant, one of the most important and influential figures in the history of philosophy. With specially-commissioned contributions from leading international scholars in the field, this wide-ranging collection firstly sets Kant s work in its biographical and historical context. It then proceeds to explain and evaluate his work in metaphysics and epistemology, logic, ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of science, philosophy of religion, political philosophy, anthropology, philosophy of history, and philosophy of...

This book offers a comprehensive critique of the Kantian principle that 'objects conform to our cognition' from the perspective of a Copernican world-view which stands diametrically opposed to Kant's because founded on the principle that our cognition conforms to objects. Concerning both Kant's ontological denial in respect of space and time and his equivalence thesis in respect of 'experience' and 'objectivity', Ryall argues that Kant's transcendental idealism signally fails to account for the one thing that is essential for Copernicus and the only thing that would validate a comparison...