Kategoria BISAC: History >> Military - Strategy

"Foreword by Fred Smith, President and CEO, Federal Express

No list of the greatest people of the 20th century is complete without General George C. Marshall. Winston Churchill called him the ""organizer of victory"" and ""the last great American."" President Harry Truman referred to him as the ""great one of the age."" Tom Brokaw called him the ""godfather"" of ""the greatest generation."" Even so, many people know Marshall's name without being able to recall his many astonishing accomplishments. Among them:

* He personally trained future generals Eisenhower, Bradley, Ridgeway,...

Alfred Thayer Mahan has been called America's nineteenth-century 'evangelist of sea power' and the intellectual father of the modern US Navy. His theories have a timeless appeal, and Chinese analysts now routinely invoke Mahan's writings, exhorting their nation to build a powerful navy.

Economics is the prime motivation for maritime reorientation, and securing the sea lanes that convey foreign energy supplies and other commodities now ranks near or at the top of China's list of military priorities. This book is the first systematic effort to test the interplay between Western...

This book explores the innovations and advances in terrorist tactics and technologies to help fill the gap in the contemporary terrorism literature by developing an empirical theory of terrorist innovation. The key question concerns the global historical trends in terrorist innovation, as well as the critical factors responsible for the differences in practices among terrorist organizations.

The first part of the book provides an overview of the tactics and technology used by terrorists in the last century and identifies the key trends for the future. The second part compares four...

Confronting insurgent violence in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military has recognized the need to "re-learn" counterinsurgency. But how has the Department of Defense with its mixed efforts responded to this new strategic environment? Has it learned anything from past failures?

In The New Counterinsurgency Era, David Ucko examines DoD's institutional obstacles and initially slow response to a changing strategic reality. Ucko also suggests how the military can better prepare for the unique challenges of modern warfare, where it is charged with everything from providing...

This edited volume re-assesses the relationship between the United States, the Soviet Union and key regional players in waging and halting conflict in the Middle East between 1967 and 1973. These were pivotal years in the Arab-Israeli conflict, with the effects still very much in evidence today.

In addition to addressing established debates, the book opens up new areas of controversy, in particular concerning the inter-war years and the so-called 'War of Attrition', and underlines the risks both Moscow and Washington were prepared to run in supporting their regional clients. The...

Great Power Strategy in Asia, 1905-2005 analyzes the enduring themes underlying the strategic struggles in East Asia, beginning with the crucial event of the 1904-5 Russo-Japanese War.

Jonathan Bailey clearly shows why military history is highly relevant in understanding today's strategic problems, and how the most important areas of current affairs have their roots in often forgotten corners of military history. He makes his powerful case in three clear sections:

• an analysis of the explosive factors that led to war between Russia and Japan in 1904,...

This new book analyzes how the Soviet leadership evaluated developments in Soviet-Vietnamese relations in the years from 1949 to 1964.

Focusing on how Soviet leaders actually perceived China's role in Vietnam relative to the Soviet role, it shows how these perceptions influenced the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship. It also explains how and when Moscow's enthusiasm for the active Chinese role in Vietnam came to an end - or, in other words, from what point was Beijing's involvement in Vietnam perceived as a liability rather than an asset, in the strategies of Soviet policy makers.

The news of Wellington's momentous victory at Vitoria on 21 June 1813 reached London in early July. The celebration spawned an expectation of a rapid conclusion to events in the Peninsula. His Majesty's Government gave authority for Wellington to invade France and made noises and plans for the redeployment of the Peninsular Army in support of Russia and Prussia. Wellington, however, did not see things in quite the same way. His army was worn out and there remained sizeable French forces in Spain, so what followed had to be a carefully thought out and planned campaign.
The invasion of...

In this bold history of the men who directed and determined the outcome of the mid-seventeenth-century British wars--from Cromwell, Fairfax, and Essex to many more lesser-known figures--military historian Malcolm Wanklyn offers the first assessment of leadership and the importance of command in the civil wars.

On October 28, 1940, the Italian army under Benito Mussolini invaded Greece. The British had insisted on guaranteeing Greek and Turkish neutrality, despite the fact that Greece was never more than a limited campaign in an unlimited war as far as they were concerned. The British, however, were never quite sure that Greece was not their last foothold in Europe, and they harbored dreams of holding on to this last bastion of civilization and of protecting it with a diplomatic and military alliance -- a Balkan bloc. These dreams bore little relation to military and economic realities, and so...