This book brings together the authors' joint papers from over a period of more than twenty years. The collection includes seven papers, each of which presents a novel and rigorous model in Economic Theory.All of the models are within the domain of implementation and mechanism design theories. These theories attempt to explain how incentive schemes and organizations can be designed with the goal of inducing agents to behave according to the designer's (principal's) objectives. Most of the literature assumes that agents are fully rational. In contrast, the authors inject into each model an...

The book pulls together a series of articles by the authors that initiated the research areas of 'optimal risk adjustment' and 'optimal quality reporting.' The papers present the basic theoretical models and link them to empirical application. Design of health insurance premiums to achieve efficient and fair outcomes is also covered. The chapters in the book also cover the intellectual development of approaches to health insurance regulation, beginning with more abstract models to those with explicit empirical and policy applications.