This book challenges a basic assumption held by many responsibility theorists: that agents must be morally responsible in the retrospective sense for anything in virtue of which they deserve praise or blame (the primacy assumption). Anton sets out to defeat this assumption by showing that accepting it as well as the much more intuitive causality assumption renders us incapable of making sense of cases whereby agents seem to deserve praise and blame. She argues that retrospective moral responsibility is a species of causal responsibility (the causality assumption). Then, she illustrates...
This book challenges a basic assumption held by many responsibility theorists: that agents must be morally responsible in the retrospective sense for ...
This book provides a contemporary overview of an age-old question in philosophy, namely the connection between intellectual and moral virtues. Ideal for courses in virtue ethics and virtue epistemology, the volume includes coverage of specific topics, such as vice, ignorance, hope, courage, patience, justice and mercy.
This book provides a contemporary overview of an age-old question in philosophy, namely the connection between intellectual and moral virtues. Ideal f...
This book provides a contemporary overview of an age-old question in philosophy, namely the connection between intellectual and moral virtues. Ideal for courses in virtue ethics and virtue epistemology, the volume includes coverage of specific topics, such as vice, ignorance, hope, courage, patience, justice and mercy.
This book provides a contemporary overview of an age-old question in philosophy, namely the connection between intellectual and moral virtues. Ideal f...