A companion volume to Omaha Beachhead, this narrative rounds out the account of the landings at corps level and below and relates the course of VII Corps combat operations which resulted in the capture of Cherbourg on 27 June 1944.

United States Army Logistics, 1775-1992, is an annotated documentary history that covers the breadth and depth of Army logistics from the frozen hills of Valley Forge during the American Revolution to the burning deserts of Southwest Asia during the Persian Gulf crisis. How military personnel have dealt with logistical problems and what successive generations learned from these experiences provide valuable insights for logisticians and commanders today. Shrader's work will stimulate thought, encourage discussion, and provide perspective to an essential element of military science.

This volume provides a brief analytical description of each of the volumes in the United States Army in World War II series.

U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II fills a gap in the Army's record of its overseas activities. As David W. Hogan so clearly states, a variety of commando and guerrilla operations were conducted on the plains of Europe and in the jungles of the Pacific to harass the Axis armies, to gather intelligence, and to support the more conventional Allied military efforts, yet their significance was a matter of dispute. Hogan examines the critical issues underlying special operations and shows how American leaders employed commandos-rangers in Army parlance-and guerrillas extensively, if not...

In addition to providing a detailed chronology of Korean War mobilization and logistics, this study discusses the issues raised in the existing literature, both published and unpublished, and suggests paths for future research.

U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942-1976, is the second installment in the two-volume study on the U.S. Army's experience in "small war" situations and the development of low-intensity conflict doctrine. As the U.S. government wrestles with tough questions on how to bring peace and stability to countries torn by internal strife, Andrew J. Birtle provides context for these concerns by describing how the United States attempted to suppress insurgencies and build nations during the Cold War. Employing a range of primary and secondary sources, Birtle explains how...

U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941, is the first of a two-volume study on the U.S. Army's experience in "small war" situations and the development of low-intensity conflict doctrine. Focusing on the suppression of insurgent or other irregular forces during overseas constabulary and contingency operations from the Civil War years up to America's entry into World War II, Andrew J. Birtle has filled an important omission in military historiography by writing about the underlying theories, concepts, and methods employed in the conduct of myriad...

The Vicksburg Campaign, November 1862-July 1863 continues the series of campaign brochures commemorating our national sacrifices during the American Civil War. Author Christopher R. Gabel examines the operations for the control of Vicksburg, Mississippi. President Abraham Lincoln called Vicksburg "the key," and indeed it was as control of the Mississippi River depended entirely on the taking of this Confederate strognhold. This brochure includes five maps and fifteen illustrations.

Prior to Operation JUST CAUSE, the December 1989 U.S. intervention in Panama, American leaders had struggled for over two years with the increasingly difficult regime of General Manuel Antonio Noriega. At the time, the Panama Canal was still under U.S. administration with the U.S. Southern Command, based at Quarry Heights, charged with its security. Led by General Frederick Woerner and seconded by Maj. Gen. Bernard Loeffke, the command's Army component commander, American military leaders weathered a series of low-grade crises during 1988-1989, slowly culminating in a growing military...

The U.S. Army's Transition to the All-Volunteer Force is a compelling analysis of the process by which the Army responded to the requirements of creating an all-volunteer force, reestablished in the United States at midnight on 30 June 1973 when induction authority expired. That the transition from virtual dependency on the draft to a manpower system based on volunteerism was accomplished nearly simultaneously with the withdrawal from Vietnam is all the more remarkable. Robert K. Griffith Jr. takes us through the turbulent years of transition from 1968 to 1974, examining both the broad...