This book traces the development of American radio intelligence at the operational and tactical levels from its beginnings in World War I through the end of World War II. It shows that signals intelligence is useful to the tactical and operational level commander. The study recommends the Army rethink signal intelligence support to the various echelons, primarily through changes to tables of organization and equipment. The book covers the initial appearance of radio intelligence units on the battlefields of France in the first world war, identifying specific instances where radio intelligence...

General Ridgway's astonishing ability to visualize military campaigns matured based on his leader development, the lessons that he learned from failure and from personally mastering operational art. During WWII, Ridgway commanded the 82nd Airborne Division in Operations HUSKY and NEPTUNE, and then the XVIII Airborne Corps in Operation MARKET, the "Battle of the Bulge" and Operation VARSITY. This monograph, through an investigation into primary sources: field orders, after action reports, and personal accounts reinforced with secondary source analysis, demonstrates that Ridgway overcame...

Lieutenant General Troy H. Middleton effectively commanded division and corps formations in World War II. His previous combat experience included command of the 47th Infantry Regiment in World War I. During the interwar period, Middleton served as an instructor at the Infantry School, Command and General Staff Course, and the Army War College. This monograph examines those factors that influenced Middleton. Command at division and corps on the World War II battlefield required experience and judgment to develop sound decisions in the stressful environment of combat. General Middleton's...

General Laurence S. Kuter served as both an operational planner and commander during the Second World War. As a planner, he co-authored Air War Plans Division Plan 1 (AWPD-1); the basic strategy upon which the United States Army Air Forces waged the war. Beyond designing the plan, Kuter helped to execute it as a commander in both the European and Mediterranean Theaters of Operation before returning to the Pentagon as a strategic planner. His service is unique in that he successfully transitioned between planning and commanding. The narrative examines Kuter's career through the end of the...

Technological advancements in airpower since World War II provide the United States with the theoretical ability to target enemies in any geographic area on earth. However, during numerous conflicts over the last 60 years, enemies of the U.S. have still enjoyed sanctuary due to political restraints placed on friendly military operations. The Korean War provides an excellent example of political restraints creating an enemy sanctuary. The U.S. military had the physical capability to target Chinese forces, particularly via airstrikes, yet it was politically restrained from doing so. The...

A study of General Walton H. Walker's career offers a lens through which to view the evolution of Army training doctrine, revealing its strengths and weaknesses over a period of nearly four decades. However, an understanding of the skills necessary to train units for combat cannot consist solely of a review of training doctrine. General Walker's career provides valuable insights into the real-world challenges a leader experienced training an Army unit, both in war and in peacetime. The resource constraints, political realities, and physical hardships that make Army training so difficult to...

South Korea needs to look ahead to problems it may face after North Korea's collapse and prepare to counter any North Korean insurgency that might result from the expansion of conflicts between political power groups. After the death of Kim Jong-il, there has been a growing concern about the chaotic aftermath of a regime collapse in the North. The South Korean military has the desire to meet the requirements for an efficient counterinsurgency campaign in order to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative against North Korea's possible insurgents. However, there currently appear to be...

Historically, the United States Army has had difficulty articulating and justifying force requirements to civilian decision makers. Most recently, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq reinvigorated the debate over estimated force requirements. Because Army planners have failed numerous times to provide force estimates acceptable to the President, the question arises, why are the planning methods inadequate and why have they not been improved? Research began by thoroughly evaluating current doctrinal methods for determining force requirements to determine the rationale for their creation. Army...