When we compromise on justice, we accept or acquiesce to an arrangement that we judge to be unjust, or at least not fully just. Such arrangements are often described as constituting a modus vivendi . What reasons could we have to accept a modus vivendi, thereby compromising on justice? Given the fact of disagreement on justice, this is an important, but rather neglected question in political philosophy. One possible answer, inspired by John Rawls, is that compromising on justice is only justified if this nonetheless brings us as close to ideal justice as possible under given circumstances....
When we compromise on justice, we accept or acquiesce to an arrangement that we judge to be unjust, or at least not fully just. Such arrangements a...
This book explores the morality of compromising. He explains how it is possible to have moral reasons to agree to moral compromises and he debates our moral duties and obligations in making such compromises.
This book explores the morality of compromising. He explains how it is possible to have moral reasons to agree to moral compromises and he debates our...
From citizens paying taxes to employees following their bosses' orders and kids obeying their parents, we take it for granted that a whole range of authorities have the power to impose duties on others. However, although authority is often accepted in practice, it looks philosophically problematic if we conceive persons as free and equals.
From citizens paying taxes to employees following their bosses' orders and kids obeying their parents, we take it for granted that a whole range of au...
