The surprise of the Yom Kippur War (1973) rivals that of the other two major strategic surprises in the twentieth century--Operation Barbarossa, the German surprise attack on the Soviet Union and the bombing of Pearl Harbor. The major difference between these events is that Israeli intelligence had a lot more and better quality information leading up to the attack than did the Soviet Union or the United States prior to those attacks. Why, then, was the beginning of the Yom Kippur War such a surprise? While many scholars have tried to explain why Israel was caught unawares despite its...
The surprise of the Yom Kippur War (1973) rivals that of the other two major strategic surprises in the twentieth century--Operation Barbarossa, the G...
The Normalization of War in Israeli Discourse, 1967-2008, by Dalia Gavriely-Nuri opens a window to how Israelis talk, write, and think about war. In the post-World War II period, Israel has taken part in eight wars, more than almost any other western democracy. In addition to "official" wars, Israel has experienced two Intifadas and repetitive long periods of bombings of its border-settlements. This book argues that such an intensive involvement in military actions provides a natural arena for a uniquely fertile war discourse. Gavriely-Nuri identifies a special war discourse: a...
The Normalization of War in Israeli Discourse, 1967-2008, by Dalia Gavriely-Nuri opens a window to how Israelis talk, write, and think about war. In t...
