The Rules of Thought develops a rationalist theory of mental content while defending a traditional epistemology of philosophy. Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa and Benjamin W. Jarvis contend that a capacity for pure rational thought is fundamental to mental content itself and underwrites our quotidian reasoning and extraordinary philosophical engagement alike. Part I of the book develops a Fregean theory of mental content, according to which rational relations between propositions play a central role in individuating contents; the theory is designed to be sensitive not only to Frege's puzzle and...

Jonathan Ichikawa develops a contextualist semantics for knowledge ascriptions, and shows how it can illuminate foundational questions in epistemology. He argues that in thinking clearly about knowledge, epistemologists must also think about the dynamic aspects of the words we use to talk about knowledge. Contextualising Knowledge defends a central theoretical role for knowledge in broader theorising - evidence, belief, justification, and assertion are all explained in part in terms of knowledge - but none of these connections can properly be understood or appreciated independently from the...