During the early years of the Iraq War, the US Army was unable to translate initial combat success into strategic and political victory. Iraq plunged into a complex insurgency, and defeating this insurgency required beating highly adaptive foes. A competition between the hierarchical and vertically integrated army and networked and horizontally integrated insurgents ensued. The latter could quickly adapt and conduct networked operations in a decentralized fashion; the former was predisposed to fighting via prescriptive plans under a centralized command and control.
To achieve...
During the early years of the Iraq War, the US Army was unable to translate initial combat success into strategic and political victory. Iraq plung...
It Takes More than a Network presents a structured investigation of the Iraqi insurgency's capacity for and conduct of organizational adaptation. In particular, it answers the question of why the Iraqi insurgency was seemingly so successful between 2003 and late 2006 and yet nearly totally collapsed by 2008. The book's main argument is that the Iraqi insurgency failed to achieve longer-term organizational goals because many of its organizational strengths were also its organizational weaknesses: these characteristics abetted and then corrupted the Iraqi insurgency's ability to adapt....
It Takes More than a Network presents a structured investigation of the Iraqi insurgency's capacity for and conduct of organizational adaptatio...
It Takes More than a Network presents a structured investigation of the Iraqi insurgency's capacity for and conduct of organizational adaptation. In particular, it answers the question of why the Iraqi insurgency was seemingly so successful between 2003 and late 2006 and yet nearly totally collapsed by 2008. The book's main argument is that the Iraqi insurgency failed to achieve longer-term organizational goals because many of its organizational strengths were also its organizational weaknesses: these characteristics abetted and then corrupted the Iraqi insurgency's ability to...
It Takes More than a Network presents a structured investigation of the Iraqi insurgency's capacity for and conduct of organizational adapta...
RAND Arroyo Center was asked by U.S. Army Cyber Command's G35 office to develop and document an Army strategy for providing cyber support to corps and below. This report proposes a strategy for tactical Army cyber operations, enumerating overarching goals, objectives, and associated activities. Instructive case studies are provided that support implementation of the strategy.
RAND Arroyo Center was asked by U.S. Army Cyber Command's G35 office to develop and document an Army strategy for providing cyber support to corps and...
