This volume examines the affective and social dimensions of self-related activities. This is a novel way of approaching traditional questions such as the scope and purpose of self-knowledge, the interrelation between the social and the individual person, and the significance of emotional appraisal. Focusing on self-evaluation instead of self-knowledge in shifting from a doxastic to an axiological perspective. The scientific added value created by this approach is threefold: i) it opens up a broadr perspective on the structure of self-reflection which includes a matrix of values; ii) as...

The book contains contributions by leading figures in philosophy of mind and action, emotion theory, and phenomenology. As the focus of the volume is truly innovative we expect the book to sell well to both philosophers and scholars from neighboring fields such as social and cognitive science. The predominant view in analytic philosophy is that an ability for self-evaluation is constitutive for agency and intentionality. Until now, the debate is limited in two (possibly mutually related) ways: Firstly, self-evaluation is usually discussed in individual terms, and, as such, not sufficiently...

The contributions gathered in this volume present the state of the art in key areas of current social ontology. They focus on the role of collective intentional states in creating social facts, and on the nature of intentional properties of groups that allow characterizing them as responsible agents, or perhaps even as persons. Many of the essays are inspired by contemporary action theory, emotion theory, and theories of collective intentionality. Another group of essays revisits early phenomenological approaches to social ontology and accounts of sociality that draw on the Hegelian idea of...

This volume examines key areas of social ontology. It focuses on the role of collective intentional states in creating social facts, and on the nature of intentional properties of groups that allow characterizing them as responsible agents.