The view that persons are entitled to respect because of their moral agency is commonplace in contemporary moral theory. What exactly this respect entails, however, is far less uncontroversial. In this book, Van der Rijt argues powerfully that this respect for persons moral agency must also encompass respect for their subjective moral judgments even when these judgments can be shown to be fundamentally flawed.

Van der Rijt scrutinises the role persons subjective moral judgments play within the context of coercion and domination. His fresh, original analysis of Kant 's third formulation...

The view that persons are entitled to respect because of their moral agency is commonplace in contemporary moral theory. What exactly this respect entails, however, is far less uncontroversial. In this book, Van der Rijt argues powerfully that this respect for persons' moral agency must also encompass respect for their subjective moral judgments - even when these judgments can be shown to be fundamentally flawed.

Van der Rijt scrutinises the role persons' subjective moral judgments play within the context of coercion and domination. His fresh, original analysis of Kant's third...