The World Trade Organization --backbone of today's international commercial relations --requires member countries to "self-enforce" exporters' access to foreign markets. Its dispute settlement system is the crown jewel of the international trading system, but its benefits still fall disproportionately to wealthy nations. Could the system be doing more on behalf of developing countries? In "Self-Enforcing Trade," Chad P. Bown explains why the answer is an emphatic "yes."
Bown argues that as poor countries look to the benefits promised by globalization as part of their overall development...
The World Trade Organization --backbone of today's international commercial relations --requires member countries to "self-enforce" exporters' acce...
The WTO allows its members to retaliate in the face of continued non-compliance. After more than ten years' operation and ten arbitration disputes, this volume assesses the law, economics and politics of trade sanctions in WTO dispute settlement. Including more than thirty contributions from leading academics, trade diplomats and practitioners, it offers a thorough analysis of the legal rules on permissible WTO retaliation as well as an assessment of the economic rationale and calculations behind the mechanism. In addition, it provides first hand experiences of those countries that have...
The WTO allows its members to retaliate in the face of continued non-compliance. After more than ten years' operation and ten arbitration disputes, th...
