Why should we avoid doing moral wrong? The inability of philosophy to answer this question in a compelling manner--along with the moral skepticism and ethical confusion that ensue--result, Stephen Darwall argues, from our failure to appreciate the essentially interpersonal character of moral obligation. After showing how attempts to vindicate morality have tended to change the subject--falling back on nonmoral values or practical, first-person considerations--Darwall elaborates the interpersonal nature of moral obligations: their inherent link to our responsibilities to one another as...
Why should we avoid doing moral wrong? The inability of philosophy to answer this question in a compelling manner--along with the moral skepticism ...
Stephen Darwall presents a series of essays that explore the view that central moral concepts are irreducibly second-personal, in that they entail mutual accountability and the authority to address demands. He illustrates the power of the second-personal framework to illuminate a wide variety of issues in moral, political, and legal philosophy. Section I concerns morality: its distinctiveness among normative concepts; the metaethics of 'bipolar obligations' (owed to someone); the relation between moral obligation's form and the substance of our obligations; whether the fact that an...
Stephen Darwall presents a series of essays that explore the view that central moral concepts are irreducibly second-personal, in that they entail mut...
In Honor, History, and Relationship Stephen Darwall explores the idea of a second-personal framework for morality and its foundations, in which we are committed to morality by presuppositions that are inescapable when we relate to others (person to person). He expands on the argument set forth in The Second-Person Standpoint to explore the second-personal framework in three further settings. The first concerns a fundamental difference between the form that respect and the concept of person take in honor cultures, on the one hand, and the shape these assume in morality conceived as equal...
In Honor, History, and Relationship Stephen Darwall explores the idea of a second-personal framework for morality and its foundations, in which we are...
In Honor, History, and Relationship Stephen Darwall explores the idea of a second-personal framework for morality and its foundations, in which we are committed to morality by presuppositions that are inescapable when we relate to others (person to person). He expands on the argument set forth in The Second-Person Standpoint to explore the second-personal framework in three further settings. The first concerns a fundamental difference between the form that respect and the concept of person take in honor cultures, on the one hand, and the shape these assume in...
In Honor, History, and Relationship Stephen Darwall explores the idea of a second-personal framework for morality and its foundations, in whi...
This magisterial study tells the story of a new way of doing ethics, starting in the seventeenth century, that was based on secular ideas of human psychology and universal accountability. It also shows that this modern approach remains relevant to us today and that it has a vibrant future.
This magisterial study tells the story of a new way of doing ethics, starting in the seventeenth century, that was based on secular ideas of human psy...
