Philosophers often use the term "naturalism' in order to describe their work. It is commonplace to see a metaphysical, epistemological and/or ethical position self-described and described by others as one that is "naturalized." But what, if anything, does the term naturalized add--or subtract---to the position being articulated? I demonstrate in The Problem of Naturalism: Analytic and Continental Perspectives, that the term naturalism connotes such a broad meaning that it is difficult to demarcate naturalism from philosophy itself. Still, many philosophers have tried to provide non-trivial...

In Romans 7:14-25, Paul declares, ""For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want, is what I do"" (KJV). St. Paul's statement is a universal truth for all human beings; humans--whether Christians, Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus, or atheists--are prone to committing free actions that are not ""good."" Furthermore, and irrespective of how we might construe the notion of ""good"" (whether as acting in accordance with some religious or spiritual precept or simply doing what is in one's best interest), we often knowingly and freely choose actions that may, or in fact do, harm us....

"The world viewed from the inside, the world defined and determined according to its "intelligible character"--it would be "will to power" and nothing else." Cryptic passages like this one from section 36 of Beyond Good and Evil have been the source of much intrigue, speculation, and puzzlement in the Nietzschean secondary literature. This passage in particular along with many others, have sparked a slew of questions in recent decades such as: "What is the will to power? "Is will to power a metaphysical principle?" "Is it an empirical assertion?" "Or, is will to power merely a hypothesis that...