This work addresses many persistent misconceptions of what the monitors were for, and why they failed in other roles associated with naval operations of the Civil War (such as the repulse at Charleston, April 7, 1863). Monitors were 'ironclads'- not fort-killers. Their ultimate success is to be measured not in terms of spearheading attacks on fortified Southern ports but in the quieter, much more profound, strategic deterrence of Lord Palmerston's ministry in London, and the British Royal Navy's potential intervention.
The relatively unknown 'Cold War' of the American Civil War was a...
This work addresses many persistent misconceptions of what the monitors were for, and why they failed in other roles associated with naval operatio...
A revealing new examination of Palmerstonian diplomacy during the pivotal decade of the 1860s, the evolution of the modern capital ship and the real nature of empire', technology' and seapower'. In contrast to the standard image of the mid-Victorian Royal navy as all-powerful, Howard Fuller shows how it suffered serious challenges in this period. Global naval supremacy was no longer unassailable' or certain. He skilfully demonstrates how what was good naval practice during the Trent Affair was no longer good in the American Civil War once the Unionist side introduced the monitor' form of...
A revealing new examination of Palmerstonian diplomacy during the pivotal decade of the 1860s, the evolution of the modern capital ship and the real n...
