Arguing about Metaethics collects together some of the most exciting contemporary work in metaethics in one handy volume. In it, many of the most influential philosophers in the field discuss key questions in metaethics:
Do moral properties exist?
If they do, how do they fit into the world as science conceives it?
If they don't exist, then how should we understand moral thought and language?
What is the relation between moral judgement and motivation?
As well as these questions, this volume discusses a wide range of issues including moral...
Arguing about Metaethics collects together some of the most exciting contemporary work in metaethics in one handy volume. In it, many of t...
For centuries, certain moral philosophers have maintained that morality is an illusion, comparable to talking of ghosts or unicorns. These moral skeptics claim that the world simply doesn t contain the sort of properties (such as moral badness, moral obligation, etc.) necessary to render moral statements true. Even seemingly obvious moral claims, such as "killing innocents is morally wrong" fail to be true. What would lead someone to adopt such a radical viewpoint? Are the arguments in its favor defensible or plausible? What impact would embracing such a view have on one s practical...
For centuries, certain moral philosophers have maintained that morality is an illusion, comparable to talking of ghosts or unicorns. These moral sk...
Metaethics is an engaging and argumentative textbook introducing advanced students to the cutting edge of the debate in one of the most exciting areas of contemporary philosophy. Kirchin covers key topics, including varieties of moral realism, error theory, noncognitivism, and a brand new position; metaethical pluralism.
Metaethics is an engaging and argumentative textbook introducing advanced students to the cutting edge of the debate in one of the most exciting areas...
For centuries, certain moral philosophers have maintained that morality is an illusion, comparable to talking of ghosts or unicorns. These moral skeptics claim that the world simply doesn t contain the sort of properties (such as moral badness, moral obligation, etc.) necessary to render moral statements true. Even seemingly obvious moral claims, such as "killing innocents is morally wrong" fail to be true. What would lead someone to adopt such a radical viewpoint? Are the arguments in its favor defensible or plausible? What impact would embracing such a view have on one s practical...
For centuries, certain moral philosophers have maintained that morality is an illusion, comparable to talking of ghosts or unicorns. These moral sk...
Derek Parfit was one of the world's leading philosophers. His On What Matters was the most eagerly awaited book in philosophy for many years. Reading Parfit: On What Matters is an essential overview and assessment of volumes 1 and 2 of Parfit's monumental work by a team of international contributors, and includes responses by Parfit himself. It discusses central features of Parfit's book, including the structure and nature of reasons; the ideas underlying moral principles; Parfit's discussions of consequentialism, contractualism and Kantian deontology; and his metaethical...
Derek Parfit was one of the world's leading philosophers. His On What Matters was the most eagerly awaited book in philosophy for many years...
Derek Parfit was one of the world's leading philosophers. His On What Matters was the most eagerly awaited book in philosophy for many years. Reading Parfit: On What Matters is an essential overview and assessment of volumes 1 and 2 of Parfit's monumental work by a team of international contributors, and includes responses by Parfit himself. It discusses central features of Parfit's book, including the structure and nature of reasons; the ideas underlying moral principles; Parfit's discussions of consequentialism, contractualism and Kantian deontology; and his metaethical...
Derek Parfit was one of the world's leading philosophers. His On What Matters was the most eagerly awaited book in philosophy for many years...
We use evaluative terms and concepts every day. We call actions right and wrong, teachers wise and ignorant, and pictures elegant and grotesque. Philosophers place evaluative concepts into two camps. Thin concepts, such as goodness and badness, and rightness and wrongness have evaluative content, but they supposedly have no or hardly any nonevaluative, descriptive content: they supposedly give little or no specific idea about the character of the person or thing described. In contrast, thick concepts such as kindness, elegance and wisdom supposedly give a more specific idea...
We use evaluative terms and concepts every day. We call actions right and wrong, teachers wise and ignorant, and pictures elegant and grotesque. Philo...
