Previous research on the institutional structure of franchising networks (Bri- ley et al. 1991; Lutz 1995; Shane 1998; Lafontaine and Shaw 1999, 2005; - fuso 2002; Penard et al. 2003a, b) does not explain the governance structure of the franchising firm as an institutional entity that consists of two interrelated parts: Residual decision rights and ownership rights. The latter includes not only residual income rights of franchised outlets but also residual income rights of franchisor-owned outlets. Previous studies primarily examines the incentive, signalling and screening effects of fees,...

The organization of interfirm networks, such as alliances, cooperatives, franchise and retail chains, has become an important research topic in the field of economics, marketing, strategic management, and organization theory. This book contributes to the literature on formal and informal inter-organizational governance by providing new insights on contract design, ownership, evolution of cooperation, role of social capital and performance in franchising networks; includes topics of loyalty, reputation and organizational form as well as performance of cooperatives, and discusses the...