Law is traditionally conceived as consisting of norms of conduct and power-conferring norms. This conception, however, is unable to account for a variety of elements of modern legal systems that differ significantly from the classical notions. This book concerns the problem of which results of human activity can obtain legal validity. The author makes use of recent findings in speech act theory, especially John R. Searle and Daniel Vanderveken's illocutionary logic. He sets out a theory of legal norms conceived as institutional legal facts resulting from performances of speech acts specified...

Building on his contributions to institutional legal theory in Institutional Legal Facts of 1993 (Law and Philosophy Library, volume 18), the author presents a comprehensive theory of legal institutions. To that end, the initial theoretical approach, which mainly concentrated on problems connected with legal powers and legal acts (acts-in-law), is widened to allow for the development of a theory of legal judgements capable of accounting not only for enacted but also unwritten law (legal principles and customary law). With the use of the concept of institutional legal facts, the...