This book deals with a basic problem arising within the Bayesian approach 1 to scientific methodology, namely the choice of prior probabilities. The problem will be considered with special reference to some inference methods used within Bayesian statistics (BS) and the so-called theory of inductive 2 probabilities (T/P). In this study an important role will be played by the assumption - defended by Sir Karl Popper and the supporters of the current verisimilitude theory (VT) - that the cognitive goal of science is the achievement of a high degree of truthlikeness or verisimilitude. A more...
This book deals with a basic problem arising within the Bayesian approach 1 to scientific methodology, namely the choice of prior probabilities. The p...
The problem of the choice of prior probabilities for Bayesian inferences is considered, with special reference to the theory of inductive probabilities and the analysis of the multinomial inferences provided by Bayesian statistics. Among other things, it is argued that the choice of prior probabilities in a given empirical inquiry should be suitably restricted by specific contextual constraints' such as the available background knowledge and the cognitive goal of the inquiry, where this goal is assumed to be the achievement of a high degree of verisimilitude. One of the most original features...
The problem of the choice of prior probabilities for Bayesian inferences is considered, with special reference to the theory of inductive probabilitie...