Contributing to the literature on democratic transitions and with a focus on institutional bargaining, in this fascinating book the Hungarian case is contrasted with those of Poland, South Africa and China to explore the contours of what bargaining strategies affect outcomes. The result is an increased understanding of how actors and their interaction can make peaceful transition possible.

When the Senate released its so-called "Torture Report" in December 2014 the world would learn that, for years, the CIA had used unimaginably brutal methods to interrogate its prisoners - often without yielding any useful or truthful information. The agency had long and adamantly defended its use of torture, staunchly arguing that it was not only just but necessary for the country's safety. And even amid the revelations of the report, questions abound about whether torture can be considered a justifiable tool of national security.

Is interrogational torture an effective method of...

Contributing to the literature on democratic transitions and with a focus on institutional bargaining, in this fascinating book the Hungarian case is contrasted with those of Poland, South Africa and China to explore the contours of what bargaining strategies affect outcomes.

Is interrogational torture effective? What do we mean by "effective"? How brutal can torture get and be considered justifiable? In this book, John W. Schiemann adopts game theory in an attempt to answer these questions, walking the reader through the logic of interrogational torture-and finding that it is far more brutal than proponents believe.