This book presents papers read at the Conference on Legal Theory and Philosophy of Science, held at Lund, December 11-14,1983. The main idea of the conference was to arti- culate, to test, and to apply scientific rationality with regard to the domain of law and legal reasoning. Although. very different views were presented, the general impres- sion is that this idea may have some future, as it yielded many surprising and stimulating discussions in Lund. The editors express their gratitude to Torsten S5der- bergs och Ragnar S5derbergs Stiftelser, Marianne och Marcus Wallenbergs Stiftelse,...

The present study which I have subtitled A Study in Law and Logic was prompted by the question of whether an investigation into law and legal systems could lead to the discovery of unrevealed fundamental patterns common to all such systems. This question was further stimulated by two interrelated problems. Firstly, could an inquiry be rooted in specifically legal matters, as distinct from the more usual writings on deontic logic? Secondly, could such inquiry yield a theory which would nevertheless embrace a strict and simple logical structure, permitting substantive conclusions in legal...

This book presents papers read at the Conference on Legal Theory and Philosophy of Science, held at Lund, December 11-14,1983. The main idea of the conference was to arti- culate, to test, and to apply scientific rationality with regard to the domain of law and legal reasoning. Although. very different views were presented, the general impres- sion is that this idea may have some future, as it yielded many surprising and stimulating discussions in Lund. The editors express their gratitude to Torsten S5der- bergs och Ragnar S5derbergs Stiftelser, Marianne och Marcus Wallenbergs Stiftelse,...

The present study which I have subtitled A Study in Law and Logic was prompted by the question of whether an investigation into law and legal systems could lead to the discovery of unrevealed fundamental patterns common to all such systems. This question was further stimulated by two interrelated problems. Firstly, could an inquiry be rooted in specifically legal matters, as distinct from the more usual writings on deontic logic? Secondly, could such inquiry yield a theory which would nevertheless embrace a strict and simple logical structure, permitting substantive conclusions in legal...