David P. Forsythe Patrice C. McMahon Andrew Hall Wedeman
In this volume, several leading foreign policy and international relations experts consider the long term prospects and implications of US foreign policy as it has been shaped and practiced during the presidency of George W. Bush.
The essays in this collection - based on the research of well-respected scholars such as Ole Holsti, Loch Johnson, John Ruggie, Jack Donnelly, Robert Leiber, Karen Mingst, and Edward Luck - offer a clear assessment: while US resources are substantial, Washington's ability to shape outcomes in the world is challenged by its expansive foreign policy goals,...
In this volume, several leading foreign policy and international relations experts consider the long term prospects and implications of US foreign ...
David P. Forsythe Patrice C. McMahon Andrew Hall Wedeman
In this volume, several leading foreign policy and international relations experts consider the long term prospects and implications of US foreign policy as it has been shaped and practiced during the presidency of George W. Bush.
The essays in this collection - based on the research of well-respected scholars such as Ole Holsti, Loch Johnson, John Ruggie, Jack Donnelly, Robert Leiber, Karen Mingst, and Edward Luck - offer a clear assessment: while US resources are substantial, Washington's ability to shape outcomes in the world is challenged by its expansive foreign policy goals,...
In this volume, several leading foreign policy and international relations experts consider the long term prospects and implications of US foreign ...
Andrew Wedeman argues that economic reform in China succeeded because government failed to prevent local officials from forcing prices to market levels. Reformers opted for a hybrid system of price controls in the 1980s, wherein commodities had both fixed and floating prices. Depressed fixed prices led to "resource wars," as localities vied for control over undervalued commodities while inflated prices fueled an investment boom that saturated markets and led to import barriers. Although local rent seeking and protectionism appeared to carve up the economy, they had actually cleared the way...
Andrew Wedeman argues that economic reform in China succeeded because government failed to prevent local officials from forcing prices to market level...
According to conventional wisdom, rising corruption reduces economic growth. And yet, between 1978 and 2010, even as officials were looting state coffers, extorting bribes, raking in kickbacks, and scraping off rents at unprecedented rates, the Chinese economy grew at an average annual rate of 9 percent. In Double Paradox, Andrew Wedeman seeks to explain why the Chinese economy performed so well despite widespread corruption at almost kleptocratic levels.
Wedeman finds that the Chinese economy was able to survive predatory corruption because corruption did not explode until...
According to conventional wisdom, rising corruption reduces economic growth. And yet, between 1978 and 2010, even as officials were looting state c...
According to conventional wisdom, rising corruption reduces economic growth. And yet, between 1978 and 2010, even as officials were looting state coffers, extorting bribes, raking in kickbacks, and scraping off rents at unprecedented rates, the Chinese economy grew at an average annual rate of 9 percent. In Double Paradox, Andrew Wedeman seeks to explain why the Chinese economy performed so well despite widespread corruption at almost kleptocratic levels.
Wedeman finds that the Chinese economy was able to survive predatory corruption because corruption did not explode until...
According to conventional wisdom, rising corruption reduces economic growth. And yet, between 1978 and 2010, even as officials were looting state c...
