Uncertainty is present in nearly every tort litigation; this book confronts the issue, at both doctrinal and policy levels. It presents and critically examines the existing doctrinal solutions of the problem and offers a number of original solutions to the problem, such as imposition of collective liability and liability for evidential damage. It also combines the traditional doctrinal depiction of the law, as evolved in England, Canada, United States, and Israel, with general theoretical insights.
Uncertainty is present in nearly every tort litigation; this book confronts the issue, at both doctrinal and policy levels. It presents and critically...
Lawyers, judges, and scholars have long debated whether incentives in tort, contract, and restitution law effectively promote the welfare of society. If these incentives were ideal, tort law would reduce the cost and frequency of accidents, contract law would lubricate transactions, and restitution law would encourage people to benefit others. Unfortunately, the incentives in these laws lead to too many injuries, too little contractual cooperation, and too few unrequested benefits. Getting Incentives Right explains how law might better serve the social good.
In tort law,...
Lawyers, judges, and scholars have long debated whether incentives in tort, contract, and restitution law effectively promote the welfare of societ...
Representing an unprecedented joint effort from top scholars in the field, this volume collects original contributions to examine the fundamental role of fault in contract law. Is it immoral to breach a contract? Should a breaching party be punished more harshly for willful breach? Does it matter if the victim of breach engaged in contributory fault? Is there room for a calculus of fault within the efficient breach framework? For generations, contract liability has been viewed as a no-fault regime, in sharp contrast to tort liability. Is this dichotomy real? Is it justified? How do the...
Representing an unprecedented joint effort from top scholars in the field, this volume collects original contributions to examine the fundamental role...
Lawyers, judges, and scholars have long debated whether incentives in tort, contract, and restitution law effectively promote the welfare of society. If these incentives were ideal, tort law would reduce the cost and frequency of accidents, contract law would lubricate transactions, and restitution law would encourage people to benefit others. Unfortunately, the incentives in these laws lead to too many injuries, too little contractual cooperation, and too few unrequested benefits. Getting Incentives Right explains how law might better serve the social good.
In tort law,...
Lawyers, judges, and scholars have long debated whether incentives in tort, contract, and restitution law effectively promote the welfare of societ...
