The U.S. Army believes that deception is a vital part of military operations. Field Manual 100-5, Operations, acknowledges that the Soviet Army mastered operational deception in World War II. While its success is widely recognized, there are few published Western assessments of Soviet operational deception. Soviet Operational Deception: The Red Cloak, by Lieutenant Colonel Richard N. Armstrong. examines the role of operational deception in the Red Army's World War II victories. This Combat Studies Institute special study focuses on operational level deception planning, allocation of...
The U.S. Army believes that deception is a vital part of military operations. Field Manual 100-5, Operations, acknowledges that the Soviet Army master...
For twenty-five years, it was the author's job to watch and examine the Soviet Army for a possible conflict, and to understand the Soviet Army's use of its combat experience. In Richard Armstrong's new book, Red Army Legacies: Essays on Forces, Capabilities & Personalities, eleven essays show how the Soviet Army used its Red Army Legacy. Among the subjects covered are Part I-Forces; Chapter One-Guards of Destruction; Chapter Two-The Bukrin Drop: Limits to Creativity; Chapter Three-Tank Corps Commander; Chapter Four-Moblie Groups: Prologue to MG: Part II-Capabilities; Chapter Five-Hunting...
For twenty-five years, it was the author's job to watch and examine the Soviet Army for a possible conflict, and to understand the Soviet Army's use o...
