Invariably, armies are accused of preparing to fight the previous war. In Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl-a veteran of both Operation Desert Storm and the current conflict in Iraq-considers the now-crucial question of how armies adapt to changing circumstances during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared. Through the use of archival sources and interviews with participants in both engagements, Nagl compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1960 with what...
Invariably, armies are accused of preparing to fight the previous war. In Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl-a ...
When the U.S. military invaded Iraq, it lacked a common understanding of the problems inherent in counterinsurgency campaigns. It had neither studied them, nor developed doctrine and tactics to deal with them. It is fair to say that in 2003, most Army officers knew more about the U.S. Civil War than they did about counterinsurgency. The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual was written to fill that void. The result of unprecedented collaboration among top U.S. military experts, scholars, and practitioners in the field, the manual espouses an approach to combat...
When the U.S. military invaded Iraq, it lacked a common understanding of the problems inherent in counterinsurgency campaigns. It had neither studied ...
" American success or failure in Iraq may well depend on whether the Iraqis like American soldiers or not. " The U.S. military could certainly have used that bit of wisdom in 2003, as violence began to eclipse the Iraq War s early successes. Ironically, had the Army only looked in its own archives, they would have found it that piece of advice is from a manual the U.S. War Department handed out to American servicemen posted in Iraq back in 1943. The advice in "Instructions for American Servicemen in Iraq during World War II," ""presented here in a new facsimile edition, retains a...
" American success or failure in Iraq may well depend on whether the Iraqis like American soldiers or not. " The U.S. military could certainly hav...
Armies are invariably accused of preparing to fight the last war. Nagl examines how armies learn during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared in organization, training, and mindset. He compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948-1960 with that developed in the Vietnam Conflict from 1950-1975, through use of archival sources and interviews with participants in both conflicts. In examining these two events, he argues that organizational culture is the key variable in determining the success or failure of...
Armies are invariably accused of preparing to fight the last war. Nagl examines how armies learn during the course of conflicts for which they are ...
This volume in the Praeger Security International (PSI) series Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era defines the laws of insurgency and outlines the strategy and tactics to combat such threats. Drawn from the observations of a French officer, David Galula, who witnessed guerrilla warfare on three continents, the book remains relevant today as American policymakers, military analysts, and members of the public look to the counterinsurgency era of the 1960s for lessons to apply to the current situation in Iraq and Afghanistan. With a new foreword by John A. Nagl, author of "Counterinsurgency...
This volume in the Praeger Security International (PSI) series Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era defines the laws of insurgency and outlines th...
This volume in the Praeger Security International (PSI) series Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era defines the laws of insurgency and outlines the strategy and tactics to combat such threats. Drawn from the observations of a French officer, David Galula, who witnessed guerrilla warfare on three continents, the book remains relevant today as American policymakers, military analysts, and members of the public look to the counterinsurgency era of the 1960s for lessons to apply to the current situation in Iraq and Afghanistan. With a new foreword by John A. Nagl, author of "Counterinsurgency...
This volume in the Praeger Security International (PSI) series Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era defines the laws of insurgency and outlines th...
Following the invasion of Iraq in 2003 the U.S. military found itself in a battle with a lethal and adaptive insurgency, where the divisions between enemy and ally were ambiguous at best, and working with the local population was essential for day-to-day survival. From the lessons they learned during multiple tours of duty in Iraq, two American veterans have penned "The Defense of Jisr al-Doreaa," an instructional parable of counterinsurgency that addresses the myriad of difficulties associated with war in the postmodern era.
In this tactical primer based on the military classic "The...
Following the invasion of Iraq in 2003 the U.S. military found itself in a battle with a lethal and adaptive insurgency, where the divisions betwee...
From one of the most important Army officers of his generation, a memoir of the military's revolution in counterinsurgency warfare Delivering a profound education in modern warfare, John Nagl's Knife Fights is essential reading for anyone who cares about the fate of America's soldiers and the purposes for which their lives are put at risk. As an army tank commander in the first Gulf War, Nagl was an early convert to the view that America's greatest future threats would come from asymmetric warfare--guerrillas, terrorists, and insurgents. His Oxford thesis on the...
From one of the most important Army officers of his generation, a memoir of the military's revolution in counterinsurgency warfare Deli...
