The Russians were wrong-footed from the start, fighting in Manchuria at the end of a 5,000 mile single track railway; the Japanese were a week or so from their bases. The Russian command structure was hopelessly confused, their generals old and incompetent, the Tsar cautious and uncertain. The Russian naval defeat at Tsushima was as farcical as it was complete. The Japanese had defeated a big European power, and the lessons for the West were there for all to see, had they cared to do so. From this curious war, so unsafely ignored for the most part by the military minds of the day, Richard...

The greatest projection of power in history, dwarfing in scale and speed even the D. Day landings of 1944, was enacted in the Gulf in the spring of 1991. It marked the revolution in military affairs which has followed the ending of confrontation in Europe. But the war and its aftermath showed the vast complexities of power projection, even in the favorable conditions of the Gulf. This book is a professional study of the problems of future interventions, in terms of a complex of political and military issues, at the operational level.