Making and Breaking Governments offers a theoretical argument about how parliamentary democracy works. The authors formulate a theoretical model of how parties create new governments and either maintain them in office or, after a resignation or no-confidence vote, replace them. The theory involves strategic interaction, derives consequences, formulates empirical hypotheses on the basis of these, and tests the hypotheses with data drawn from the postwar European experience with parliamentary democracy.
Making and Breaking Governments offers a theoretical argument about how parliamentary democracy works. The authors formulate a theoretical model of ho...
Gary D. Libecap Randall Calvert Thrainn Eggertsson
In this book the author examines the problems encountered in negotiations among claimants and the political and economic considerations that influence property rights arrangements. The histories of mineral rights, rights to range and timber land, and fishery and crude oil production rights in the United States are examined and reveal a surprising variety of contractual negotiations and economic outcomes. The author concludes that in addition to an analysis of distributional outcomes, an examination of the details of the political bargaining underlying property rights contracts is essential to...
In this book the author examines the problems encountered in negotiations among claimants and the political and economic considerations that influence...
In organization theory a schism has developed between the traditional organizational behavior literature, based in psychology, sociology and political science, and the more analytically rigorous field of organizational economics. The former stresses the importance of managerial leadership and cooperation among employees, while the latter focuses on the engineering of incentive systems that will induce efficiency, and profitability, by rewarding worker self-interest. In this innovative book, Gary Miller bridges the gap between these literatures. He demonstrates that it is impossible to design...
In organization theory a schism has developed between the traditional organizational behavior literature, based in psychology, sociology and political...
Just when Japan and the United States are both caught up in a major debate over the effectiveness of their governments, this volume offers new explanations of their comparative strengths and weaknesses. Why can Japan keep building nuclear power plants while it has a hard time building an information superhighway? Why is the opposite the case in the United States? Will political reform change public policy in Japan? Would it make a difference in the United States? This volume explains why and how. This is one of the few volumes on the two countries that offers detailed studies of value to...
Just when Japan and the United States are both caught up in a major debate over the effectiveness of their governments, this volume offers new explana...
Just when Japan and the United States are both caught up in a major debate over the effectiveness of their governments, this volume offers new explanations of their comparative strengths and weaknesses. Why can Japan keep building nuclear power plants while it has a hard time building an information superhighway? Why is the opposite the case in the United States? Will political reform change public policy in Japan? Would it make a difference in the United States? This volume explains why and how. This is one of the few volumes on the two countries that offers detailed studies of value to...
Just when Japan and the United States are both caught up in a major debate over the effectiveness of their governments, this volume offers new explana...
This book examines a key question of modern Japanese politics: why the Meiji oligarchs were unable to design institutions capable of protecting their power. The authors question why the oligarchs chose the political institutions they did, and what the consequences of those choices were for Japan's political competition, economic development, and diplomatic relations. Indeed, they argue, it was the oligarchs' very inability to agree among themselves on how to rule that prompted them to cut the military loose from civilian control--a decision that was to have disastrous consequences not only...
This book examines a key question of modern Japanese politics: why the Meiji oligarchs were unable to design institutions capable of protecting their ...
Political economy has been an essential realm of inquiry and has attracted myriad intellectual adherents for much of the period of modern scholarship, although its formal split into the distinct disciplines of political science and economics in the nineteenth century has limited the study of important social issues. This volume calls for a reaffirmation of the importance of the unified study of political economy, and explores the frontiers of the interaction between politics and markets. It brings together intellectual leaders from various areas, drawing on state-of-the-art theoretical and...
Political economy has been an essential realm of inquiry and has attracted myriad intellectual adherents for much of the period of modern scholarship,...
Daniel N. Posner Randall Calvert Thrainn Eggertsson
Presenting a theory to explain how politics revolves around one axis of social cleavage instead of another, Daniel Posner examines Zambia, where people identify themselves either as members of one of the country's seventy-three tribes or as members of one of its four principal language groups. Drawing on a simple model of identity choice, Posner demonstrates that the answer depends on whether the country is operating under single-party or multi-party rule, thus revealing how formal institutional rules determine the social cleavages that matter.
Presenting a theory to explain how politics revolves around one axis of social cleavage instead of another, Daniel Posner examines Zambia, where peopl...
C. Mantzavinos Chrysostomos Mantzavinos Randall Calvert
Individuals, Institutions, and Markets offers a theory of how the institutional framework of a society emerges and how markets within institutions work. The book shows that both social institutions, defined as the rules of the game, and exchange processes can be analyzed along a common theoretical structure. Mantzavinos' proposal is that a problem solving model of individual behavior inspired by the cognitive sciences provides such a unifying theoretical structure. Integrating the latest scholarship in economics, sociology, political science, law, and anthropology, Mantzavinos offers a...
Individuals, Institutions, and Markets offers a theory of how the institutional framework of a society emerges and how markets within institutions wor...
Currently, privatization and regulatory reform are often viewed as the solution to the problem of poor performance by telecommunications and other public utilities. This volume argues that these high expectations may not always be met because of the way a country's institutions and systems interact.
Currently, privatization and regulatory reform are often viewed as the solution to the problem of poor performance by telecommunications and other pub...