"This work is essential for the philosophical assessment of Hume's contributions to our understanding of what moral agency is....It is written in a manner that is constantly sensitive to the philosophical perplexities that lie in wai for each position that the author, and Hume, considers, and it demonstrates, if anyone still needs this, just how resourceful Hume's moral theory is, even when judged in the light of our contemporary debates."--Ethics

This book is a penetrating study of the theory of mind and morality that Hume developed in his Treatise of Human Nature and other writings. Hume rejects any conception of moral beliefs and moral truths. He understands morality in terms of distinctive desires and other sentiments that arise through the correction of sympathy. Hume's theory presents a powerful challenge to recent cognitivist theories of moral judgement, Bricke argues, and suggests significant limitations to recent conventionalist and contractarian accounts of morality's content.