In this book Russell Leng examines the behavior of nations in forty militarized crises occurring between 1816 and 1980. He employs a mass of empirical data to consider the conditions under which crises escalate to war or are resolved peacefully, and suggests that the most effective bargaining strategy is one that takes into account both the dictates of power politics, and other, less rational, political and psychological factors. The epilogue presents a provocative critical account of the bargaining strategies pursued by the United States and Iraq during the Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991.

In this book Russell Leng examines the behavior of nations in forty militarized crises occurring between 1816 and 1980. He employs a mass of empirical data to consider the conditions under which crises escalate to war or are resolved peacefully, and suggests that the most effective bargaining strategy is one that takes into account both the dictates of power politics, and other, less rational, political and psychological factors. The epilogue presents a provocative critical account of the bargaining strategies pursued by the United States and Iraq during the Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991.