The rivalries between the Soviet Union and the United States, Egypt and Israel, and India and Pakistan produced twelve major crises and seven wars during the quarter-century following World War II. A disproportionate share of international crises and wars occur between long-term rivals. Why could not the leaders of these states learn to manage their disputes without severe crises or war? Russell J. Leng finds that the lessons leaders of those states drew from their experiences most often led to bargaining tactics that only increased the level of hostility and the likelihood of war in...

In this book Russell Leng examines the behavior of nations in forty militarized crises occurring between 1816 and 1980. He employs a mass of empirical data to consider the conditions under which crises escalate to war or are resolved peacefully, and suggests that the most effective bargaining strategy is one that takes into account both the dictates of power politics, and other, less rational, political and psychological factors. The epilogue presents a provocative critical account of the bargaining strategies pursued by the United States and Iraq during the Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991.

In this book Russell Leng examines the behavior of nations in forty militarized crises occurring between 1816 and 1980. He employs a mass of empirical data to consider the conditions under which crises escalate to war or are resolved peacefully, and suggests that the most effective bargaining strategy is one that takes into account both the dictates of power politics, and other, less rational, political and psychological factors. The epilogue presents a provocative critical account of the bargaining strategies pursued by the United States and Iraq during the Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991.