When did psychology become a distinct discipline? What links the continental and analytic traditions in philosophy? Answers to both questions are found in this account of the debate surrounding psychologism in Germany at the turn of the century. The trajectory of 20th century philosophy has been largely determined by this anti-naturalist view which holds that empirical research is in principle different from philosophical inquiry, and can never make significant contributions to the latter's central issues.

When did psychology become a distinct discipline? What links the continental and analytic traditions in philosophy? Answers to both questions are found in this account of the debate surrounding psychologism in Germany at the turn of the century. The trajectory of 20th century philosophy has been largely determined by this anti-naturalist view which holds that empirical research is in principle different from philosophical inquiry, and can never make significant contributions to the latter's central issues.

Psychologists and philosophers have assumed that psychological knowledge is knowledge about, and held by, the individual mind. Psychological Knowledge challenges these views. It argues that bodies of psychological knowledge are social institutions like money or the monarchy, and that mental states are social artefacts like coins or crowns.
Martin Kusch takes on arguments of alternative proposals, shows what is wrong with them, and demonstrates how his own social-philosophical approach constitutes an advance. We see that exists a substantial natural amount of philosophical...

Psychologists and philosophers have assumed that psychological knowledge is knowledge about, and held by, the individual mind. Psychological Knowledge challenges these views. It argues that bodies of psychological knowledge are social institutions like money or the monarchy, and that mental states are social artefacts like coins or crowns.
Martin Kusch takes on arguments of alternative proposals, shows what is wrong with them, and demonstrates how his own social-philosophical approach constitutes an advance. We see that exists a substantial natural amount of philosophical...

I first became interested in Husserl and Heidegger as long ago as 1980, when as an undergraduate at the Freie Universitat Berlin I studied the books by Professor Ernst Tugendhat. Tugendhat's at tempt to bring together analytical and continental philosophy has never ceased to fascinate me, and even though in more recent years other influences have perhaps been stronger, I should like to look upon the present study as still being indebted to Tugendhat's initial incentive. It was my good fortune that for personal reasons I had to con tinue my academic training from 1981 onwards in Finland. Even...

In recent years, a large number of books and articles on Foucault has been published. Almost all of the book-size studies are expository and introductory. Indeed, there seems to be no other modern philosopher with reference to whom a comparable numberofintroductionshavebeen produced in such a short period. Most ofthe articles too provide over views, rather than critical assessments or rational reconstructions, even though there existsby now a small numberoffine papers also inthe two latter genres. Moreover, more often than not, writers on Foucault approach his work as part and parcel of...

This volume brings together a number of authors that see themselves as contribu tors to, or critical commentators on, a new field that has recently emerged within the sociology of knowledge. This new field is 'the Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge' (SPK). Studying philosophers and their knowledge from broadly sociological or political perspectives is not, of course, a recent phenomenon. Marxist writers have used such perspectives throughout the twentieth century, and, since the sixties, feminist authors have also occasionally engaged in sociological analysis of philosophers' texts. What...