Concepts based on full-blown collective intentionality (aboutness), viz., we-mode intentionality, are central for understanding and explaining the social world. The book systematically studies social groups, acting in them as a group member, collective commitment, group intentions, beliefs, and actions, especially authority-based group attitudes and actions. There are also chapters on cooperation, social institutions, cultural evolution, and group responsibility.

This philosophical and conceptual study shows how social practices (customs and traditions) are "building blocks of society." Raimo Tuomela systematically reveals how social institutions are constructed from these "building blocks." His analysis is based on the novel concept of shared "we-attitudes," which represent a weak form of collective intentionality, and he makes instructive connections to major topics and figures in philosophy and the social sciences.

This philosophical and conceptual study shows how social practices (customs and traditions) are "building blocks of society." Raimo Tuomela systematically reveals how social institutions are constructed from these "building blocks." His analysis is based on the novel concept of shared "we-attitudes," which represent a weak form of collective intentionality, and he makes instructive connections to major topics and figures in philosophy and the social sciences.

In Cooperation, A Philosophical Study, Tuomela offers the first comprehensive philosophical theory of cooperation. He builds on such notions a collective and joint goals, mutual beliefs, collective commitments, acting together and acting collectively. The book analyzes the varieties of cooperation, making use of the crucial distinction between group-mode and individual-mode cooperation. The former is based on collective goals and collective commitments, the latter on private goals and commitments. The book discusses the attitudes and the kinds of practical reasoning...

This anthology consists of a collection of papers on the nature of dis- positions and the role of disposition concepts in scientific theories. I have tried to make the collection as representative as possible, except that problems specifically connected with dispositions in various special sciences are relatively little discussed. Most of these articles have been previously published. The papers by Mackie, Essler and Trapp, Fetzer (in Section 11), Levi, and Tuomela appear here for the first time, and are simultaneously published in Synthese 34, No. 4, which is a special issue on dispositions....

It is somewhat surprising to find out how little serious theorizing there is in philosophy (and in social psychology as well as sociology) on the nature of social actions or joint act. hons in the sense of actions performed together by several agents. Actions performed by single agents have been extensively discussed both in philosophy and in psycho ogy. There is, ac- cordingly, a booming field called action theory in philosophy but it has so far strongly concentrated on actions performed by single agents only. We of course should not forget game theory, a discipline that systematically...

The Philosophy of Sociality examines the nature of sociality in its various forms, with special emphasis on collective intentionality. Raimo Tuomela begins with a distinction between the "we-perspective" and the "I-perspective." His study of strong collective intentionality -- as expressed by joint intentions, collective commitment, group belief, authority-based group action, and other phenomena -- outlines the circumstances under which an individual is required to think and act as a group member. By developing a systematic theory of sociality, Tuomela investigates such topics as...

Social ontology, in its broadest sense, is the study of the nature of social reality, including collective intentions and agency. The starting point of Tuomela's account of collective intentionality is the distinction between thinking and acting as a private person ("I-mode") versus as a "we-thinking" group member ("we-mode"). The we-mode approach is based on social groups consisting of persons, which may range from simple task groups consisting of a few persons to corporations and even to political states. Tuomela extends the we-mode notion to cover groups controlled by external authority....

Social ontology, in its broadest sense, is the study of the nature of social reality, including collective intentions and agency. The starting point of Tuomela's account of collective intentionality is the distinction between thinking and acting as a private person ("I-mode") versus as a "we-thinking" group member ("we-mode"). The we-mode approach is based on social groups consisting of persons, which may range from simple task groups consisting of a few persons to corporations and even to political states. Tuomela extends the we-mode notion to cover groups controlled by external authority....