This is the first major study of post-Civil War banking panics in almost a century. The author has constructed for the first time estimates of bank closures and their incidence in each of the five separate banking disturbances. The author also reevaluates the role of the New York Clearing House in forestalling several panics and explains why it failed to do so in 1893 and 1907, concluding that structural defects of the National Banking Act were not the primary cause of the panics.

This is the first full-length study of five U.S. banking panics of the Great Depression. Professor Wicker reconstructs a close historical narrative of each of the disturbances, investigating their origins, magnitude and effects, and he reappraises the role of Federal Reserve officials in the panics. His findings challenge many of the commonly-held assumptions about the events of 1930 and 1931, and will be of wide interest to students of the Great Depression, monetary and financial historians, financial and macroeconomists.

This is the first major study of post-Civil War banking panics in almost a century. The author has constructed for the first time estimates of bank closures and their incidence in each of the five separate banking disturbances. The author also reevaluates the role of the New York Clearing House in forestalling several panics and explains why it failed to do so in 1893 and 1907, concluding that structural defects of the National Banking Act were not the primary cause of the panics.