Evolution and learning in games is a topic of current intense interest. Evolution theory is widely viewed as one of the most promising approaches to understanding learning, bounded rationality, and change in complex social environments. This book covers the recent developments with an emphasis on economic contexts and applications. Systematically presenting both deterministic and stochastic evolutionary dynamics which play an important role in evolutionary processes, it also includes the recent stochastic evolutionary framework that has been developed (and applied widely) in the last few...

Evolution and learning in games is a topic of current intense interest. Evolution theory is widely viewed as one of the most promising approaches to understanding learning, bounded rationality, and change in complex social environments. This book covers the recent developments with an emphasis on economic contexts and applications. Systematically presenting both deterministic and stochastic evolutionary dynamics which play an important role in evolutionary processes, it also includes the recent stochastic evolutionary framework that has been developed (and applied widely) in the last few...

Fernando Vega-Redondo's self-contained account of the main contributions of modern game theory and its applications to economics starts with a detailed description of how to model strategic situations. The discussion proceeds by studying basic solution concepts and their main refinements; games played under incomplete information; and repeated games. For each of these theoretical developments, the text includes a companion set of applications that cover the most representative instances of game-theoretic analysis in economics (e.g., oligopolistic competition, public goods, coordination...

Fernando Vega-Redondo's self-contained account of the main contributions of modern game theory and its applications to economics starts with a detailed description of how to model strategic situations. The discussion proceeds by studying basic solution concepts and their main refinements; games played under incomplete information; and repeated games. For each of these theoretical developments, the text includes a companion set of applications that cover the most representative instances of game-theoretic analysis in economics (e.g., oligopolistic competition, public goods, coordination...