We struggle daily with the notions of why we do what we do and of assigning values to our actions, although it seems possible through experience to gain knowledge and understanding of such matters. In contrast to the world of facts, values and morality seem insecure, easily influenced by illusion or ideology. How can objectivity and accuracy be applied to values and morality? Peter Railton's study reveals how a naturalistically informed view of the world might incorporate objective values and moral knowledge.

Jaegwon Kim is one of the most preeminent and most influential contributors to the philosophy of mind and metaphysics. This collection of essays presents the core of his work on supervenience and mind with two sets of postscripts especially written for the book. The essays focus on such issues as the nature of causation and events, what dependency relations other than causal relations connect facts and events, the analysis of supervenience, and the mind-body problem. A central problem in the philosophy of mind is the problem of explaining how the mind can causally influence bodily processes....

Warren Quinn was widely regarded as a moral philosopher of remarkable talent. This collection of his most important contributions to moral philosophy and the philosophy of action has been edited for publication by Philippa Foot. Quinn laid out the foundations for an anti-utilitarian moral philosophy that was critical of much contemporary work in ethics, such as the anti-realism of Gilbert Harman and the neo-subjectivism of Bernard Williams. Quinn's own distinctive moral theory is developed in the discussion of substantial, practical moral issues. For example, there are important pieces here...

How should we reason about what we do? The answer offered by most recent philosophy, as well as such disciplines as decision theory, welfare economics, and political science, is that we should select efficient means to our ends. However, if we ask how we should decide which ends or goals to aim at, these standard theoretical approaches are silent. Henry Richardson argues that we can determine our ends rationally. He constructs a rich and original theory of how we can reason about what to seek for its own sake as a final goal. Richardson defuses the counterarguments for the limits of rational...

Michael Devitt is a distinguished philosopher of language. In this new book he takes up issues in semantics. Three important questions lie at the core of this book: What are the main objectives of semantics? Why are they worthwhile? How should we accomplish them? Devitt answers these "methodological" questions naturalistically and explores what semantic program arises from the answers. The approach is anti-Cartesian, rejecting the idea that linguistic or conceptual competence yields any privileged access to meanings. Devitt argues for a truth-referential localism and in the process rejects...

With many adherents among contemporary philosophers, truthmaking theory is the most recent development of a realist theory of truth. D.M. Armstrong offers the first full-length study of this theory and makes a compelling case for truthmaking's importance in philosophy. His book marks a significant contribution to the debate and will be of interest to a wide range of readers working in analytical philosophy.

In this work, Professor Arda Denkel develops a unified ontology of objecthood, essences and causation. A principal tenet is that while the basic units of the physical world are substances, particular properties are the analytic ultimates of existence. Although properties must inhere in objects, individual things are nothing more than compresences of properties at particular positions. There exist no mysterious substrata. Principles explaining how properties are held together in compresences are basically the same as those that account for essences and for causal relations. There exist no...

The essays in this collection deal with the way in which we know our own minds. Professor Shoemaker opposes the "inner sense" conception of introspective self-knowledge. He defends the view that perceptual and sensory states have nonrepresentational features--"qualia"--that determine what it is like to have them. Among the other topics covered are the unity of consciousness, and the idea that the "first-person perspective" gives a privileged route to philosophical understanding of the nature of mind.

Some of a person's mental states have the power to represent real and imagined states of affairs: they have semantic properties. What Minds Can Do has two goals: to find a naturalistic or nonsemantic basis for the representational powers of a person's mind, and to show that these semantic properties are involved in the causal explanation of the person's behavior. In the process, the book addresses issues that are central to much contemporary philosophical debate. It will be of interest to a wide range of readers in philosophy of mind and of language, cognitive science, and psychology.

How should we reason about what we do? The answer offered by most recent philosophy, as well as such disciplines as decision theory, welfare economics, and political science, is that we should select efficient means to our ends. However, if we ask how we should decide which ends or goals to aim at, these standard theoretical approaches are silent. Henry Richardson argues that we can determine our ends rationally. He constructs a rich and original theory of how we can reason about what to seek for its own sake as a final goal. Richardson defuses the counterarguments for the limits of rational...