In recent years renewed attention has been directed to the importance of the role of institutional design in democratic politics. Particular interest has concerned constitutional design and the relative merits of parliamentary versus presidential systems. A virtual consensus has formed around the argument that parliamentary systems are preferable overall to presidential systems, due largely to the loss of power to the executive and assembly in presidential systems. In this book, the authors systematically assess the strengths and weaknesses of various forms of presidential systems, drawing on...

In recent years renewed attention has been directed to the importance of the role of institutional design in democratic politics. Particular interest has concerned constitutional design and the relative merits of parliamentary versus presidential systems. A virtual consensus has formed around the argument that parliamentary systems are preferable overall to presidential systems, due largely to the loss of power to the executive and assembly in presidential systems. In this book, the authors systematically assess the strengths and weaknesses of various forms of presidential systems, drawing on...

This book addresses the current debate regarding the liabilities and merits of presidential government. Does presidentialism make it less likely that democratic governments will be able to manage political conflict? With the unprecedented wave of transitions to democracy since the 1970s, this question has been hotly contested in political and intellectual circles all over the globe. The contributors to this volume examine variations among different presidential systems and skeptically view claims that presidentialism has added significantly to the problems of democratic governance and...

When Boris Yeltsin calls out the tanks and shells parliament, or when he pins medals on veterans, both acts are called executive decrees, but we do not understand both to be equivalent examples of executive discretion over policymaking. Executives increasingly take (or are given) the authority to act without concurrent legislative action. This book offers a theory of political institutions that predicts when executives should turn to decree and when legislatures should accept--or even prefer--this method of making policy. Extensive case studies demonstrate how decree has been used and abused...

When Boris Yeltsin calls out the tanks and shells parliament, or when he pins medals on veterans, both acts are called executive decrees, but we do not understand both to be equivalent examples of executive discretion over policymaking. Executives increasingly take (or are given) the authority to act without concurrent legislative action. This book offers a theory of political institutions that predicts when executives should turn to decree and when legislatures should accept--or even prefer--this method of making policy. Extensive case studies demonstrate how decree has been used and abused...